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1. Introduction 
This paper discusses the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host country development. 
While the precise importance of FDI for local development is still under debate, two basic 
mechanisms for FDI effect on a host economy have been identified. These are productivity 
spillovers within and between companies and pecuniary externalities of foreign investment. 
While productivity spillovers are a result of knowledge transmission from the investor firm, 
pecuniary externalities affect the host economy through changes in the market structure.  Both 
affect host country development, and the potential benefits have been the reason why 
governments in most countries are liberalizing their policies affecting FDI. We apply the theory 
of FDI host country benefits to Estonia, an advanced transition economy which has attracted 
significant foreign investment under a liberal policy regime. 
This is broad overview of the structure of the concepts used in this paper. Next, we introduce 
these concepts in more detail and relate them to each other. Figure 1 presents these relationships. 
Finally, we situate this study in the wider academic and policy context and present the research 
framework. 
Figure 1: Structure of the paper 
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Source: own schematization 
Foreign direct investment is undertaken by a multinational enterprise (MNE) in order to gain 
ownership and control of a firm outside the MNE home country. At the global level, FDI has 
become increasingly important since the 1990s due to two different phenomena. These are its 
sheer volume and its effect on host country development. The volume of foreign direct 
investment has rapidly risen as a result of more liberal policy since the 1960s and particularly 
after 1990. For many countries, economic opening was motivated by attracting foreign investors 
in order to upgrade domestic knowledge and thereby ensure competitiveness through 
technological catch-up. MNEs typically possess superior knowledge compared to domestic 
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companies. The expectation of it partially being transferred to the domestic economy has made 
governments worldwide invest significant resources to attract it.  
While naturally FDI affects a host economy in a multitude of ways, two principal mechanisms 
through which FDI effect on development emerge can be distinguished. These are spillover 
effects through knowledge transfer and pecuniary externalities through changes in market 
conditions. While spillover effects have been much researched, current knowledge on pecuniary 
externalities is very limited. Spillover effects are the transfer of knowledge to firms in the host 
economy, which can either take place directly through ownership or through indirect transfer to 
domestic firms. Knowledge encompasses both tangible assets such as technology and intangible 
ones like management practices. In contrast, pecuniary externalities are effects through the 
market structure. Here, the presence of an MNE changes supply and demand conditions in a 
sector and thereby affects the development of local firms. 
The question through which mechanisms and in what magnitude FDI affects host country 
development is a crucial one in policy- making around the world. Its importance is amplified by 
countries intensified need for technological upgrading to maintain global competitiveness and 
the increase in FDI available during the last decades. Significant amounts of public resources are 
spend on inward investment promotion, and evidence exists that the amount spend may not 
always be justified. This is particularly an issue as we can assume that many countries with a 
greater need for knowledge catch-up are also ones with more limited means available. A better 
understanding of mechanisms and magnitude of FDI effects on host country development can 
contribute to more targeted policies leading to more efficient use of public funds.  
Particularly the mechanisms through which FDI affects host countries have not been extensively 
researched. In most studies, mechanisms of FDI effects are treated as a “black box” as it is 
difficult to disentangle them. While the change in productivity is measured, the causes remain 
unknown. In this paper, we first perform a complete assessment of direct and indirect FDI 
effects. As a second step, we extend the study to the pecuniary effects of FDI. These may in fact 
be greater in magnitude than traditional spillover effects, but their study has hardly exceeded the 
theoretical level. Only few empirical studies are available (e.g. Görg and Strobl, 2002; Barrios et 
al, 2004). The assessment of pecuniary externalities potentially sheds some light into the “black 
box” of mechanisms through which FDI affects the host country. 
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In the Estonian case, both the assessment of FDI spillovers and pecuniary externalities extend the 
current knowledge base. While pecuniary externalities in general have hardly been studied, this 
study provides an addition to previous studies of spillover effects. Previous studies have either 
shown methodological issues or focused on one aspect of FDI spillovers. In contrast, this study 
provides a complete picture including all direct and indirect effects for all manufacturing 
industry sectors. Estonia provides a particularly interesting example for the study of FDI effects 
on host country development. In comparison with other Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries, Estonia has shown a particularly fast implementation of transition reforms combined 
with a liberal, non-discriminatory FDI policy. In contrast to other CEE countries Estonia focused 
on a favourable investment climate instead of subsidies and has recorded some of the highest per 
capita inflows. 
The theoretical background outlined above is applied to the Estonian economy. This is done by 
means of a panel data study of all enterprises in the manufacturing sector for the time period 
1998-2004. Using panel data provides an advantage over many other studies of FDI host country 
effects since single firms development can be observed over time. Specifically, we assess the 
evidence for direct and indirect spillover effects through the following three research questions. 
The first two assess spillover effects on productivity while the third one addresses pecuniary 
externalities. The first question focuses on direct effects (own firm effects) of FDI and the 
second question on indirect spillovers both at the horizontal and vertical dimension. The third 
question on pecuniary externalities assesses the role of FDI in new domestic firm development. 
Research question 1: Is there evidence for a direct effect of foreign ownership on 
domestic firm productivity? 
Research question 2: Is there evidence for indirect effects of FDI on domestic firm 
productivity? 
Research question 3: Is there evidence for an effect of FDI on the development of new 
domestic  
The basic limitations of this study are similar to other studies in the field. Despite relatively 
detailed theoretical knowledge about spillover channels, the specific importance of each cannot 
be quantified as they remain difficult to disentangle. While this is the case for productivity 
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spillovers, the assessment of pecuniary externalities contributes to our understanding of 
mechanisms of FDI effects on the host country. A second limitation is that pecuniary 
externalities are likely to emerge also through other channels then new domestic firm start-up. 
However, this aspect is the most salient one and should therefore be addressed first while leaving 
more extensive assessment of pecuniary externalities to future studies. 
2. Theoretical background 
In this chapter, we discuss the theoretical background of the effect of FDI and host country 
development. The chapter is structured as follows. First, chapter 2.1. discusses the concepts 
related to the reasons why FDI is expected to have an effect on the host country. Second, in 
chapter 2.2. we go on to discuss the specific mechanisms through which FDI is expected to affect 
host country development. Hence, we pass from first discussing the question why FDI affects a 
host country to the question of how this effect takes place. 
In chapter 2.1. three specific concepts are identified. This is the academic debate on FDI and 
development, the multinational enterprise as the actor in FDI and the concept of ownership-
specific advantages. The following Chapter 2.2 is divided into two main concepts. First, we 
discuss spillover effects of FDI which are further divided into direct and indirect effects. Second, 
we discuss FDI pecuniary externalities. Through discussion of these concepts, chapter 2 draws a 
complete overview of the reasons and mechanisms of FDI effects on host countries. 
2.1. Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Enterprise 
2.1.1. The impact of foreign direct investment in host countries 
Spurred by economic liberalization in many countries around the world, flows of foreign direct 
investment have sharply risen in the past decades. The gradual economic opening of countries in 
Asia since the 1970s, the economic restructuring in the countries of the former Soviet Union 
after 1990 and increasing liberalization in other regions such as Latin America have provided 
much impetus to this process. From US$ 200 billion in 1990, global FDI flows rose the ten-fold 
to a climax in 2007 reaching US$ 2,000 billion. In 2009, they were at US$ 1,100 billion 
(UNCTAD, 2010). 
The impact of FDI on development has been much debated. Three views of “conventional 
wisdom” on host country impact can be distinguished. These are the views of “Washington 
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Consensus”, academic skepticism and dirigisme (Moran et al, 2005). The term “Washington 
Consensus” has come to mean economic policy founded on the unrestricted belief in market 
forces (Williamson, 1999). This implies fully liberalized flows of foreign direct investment, 
asserting that FDI is always beneficial for the host economy. In contrast, the position of 
academic skepticism holds that FDI has no direct impact on development. In this view, it 
contributes no more to an economy than any other productive activity (Rodrik, 1999). Finally, 
the dirigisme view holds that governments must take significant action to influence FDI flows in 
order to ensure host country benefit. Amongst other measures, this implies the use of local 
content requirements and joint ventures. 
This debate remains of great importance as countries are developing their FDI policy taking into 
account past experiences in countries worldwide. It is clear that one common best policy for all 
countries cannot be found. In the past decades we have witnessed successful growth policy 
through both liberal economic policy in Eastern Europe countries and more state-guided policy 
in many parts of Asia. Hence, while a general relationship between FDI and development is 
difficult to establish, past experience shows us that successful policy cannot be clearly grouped 
into one archetype of view on FDI. 
The general trend however clearly has been and continues to be an increasing liberalization of 
policy. Of 71 FDI policy changes adopted in 2009, approximately 70 per cent increased support 
for liberalization and promotion of FDI (UNCTAD, 2010b). This follows a continuing trend 
since UNCTAD first started to systematically track policy changes in 1992. Some decline in the 
ratio between FDI-promoting and restricting policy has occurred as in the early 1990s practically 
all policy changes promoted free capital flows. This development can however be explained by 
an increasing diversity of countries included and relatively easy measures having been 
implemented.  
Increasing liberalization of policy has been accompanied by many governments taking 
significant action to encourage the inflow of foreign direct investment. Possibilities and 
limitations for taking action differ between countries due to different international treaty 
obligations. A multitude of different measures from direct subsidies to favorable tax policies 
have been used in both developed and developing countries. 
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Examples of tax incentives include the 12.5% corporate income tax in place in Ireland since 
2003 and the policy of exempting reinvested earnings from corporate income tax altogether in 
Estonia (Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Eurostat, 2011). Direct subsidies have also been used in 
many cases and been very significant in their extent. Examples include an equivalent of US 
$150,000 per employee paid to Mercedes to locate in Alabama or US$ 50,000 per employee paid 
to Samsung in England (Girma et al, 2001).  
These policies are founded on expectations of positive externalities to host economies. These 
positive externalities can take many forms from most visible aspects like job creation and 
technology transfer to more indirect ones such as competition effects. These spillovers from FDI 
can be defined as all benefits created by investments which are not captured by the investor 
(Moran et al, 2005). These carry great importance as the extent of spillovers to the local 
economy determines whether and to what extent host country incentives for foreign investment 
are justified. 
2.1.2. The multinational enterprise and foreign investment 
Foreign direct investment is undertaken by multinational enterprises. The MNE distinguishes 
itself from other organizations such as international trading firms and domestic enterprises by 
engaging in both cross-border production and international exchange of goods. Hence, it has two 
distinct features. First, it coordinates different value-added activities across borders. Second, in 
contrast to other organizations it internalizes some of the intermediate goods transfers within the 
organization (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). 
Two main theoretical views are applied to explain the activities of MNEs in foreign countries. 
These are the internationalization theory and the eclectic paradigm of international production, 
also referred to as the OLI framework. Both take a similar approach and build on transaction cost 
theory by Coase (1937). Internationalization theory developed from several approaches and was 
formalized by Buckley and Casson (1976). The eclectic paradigm was first introduced by 
Dunning (1981) who has since expanded it several times.  Both are similar in positing that firms 
will internalize their foreign activities when this entails lower costs than organizing the 
transaction through the market.  However, the eclectic paradigm is more specific in stating that 
each MNE faces different costs depending on its home country and industry and each specific 
host country and industry (Dunning, 2000). 
11 
 
The eclectic paradigm also allows the identification of four specific motives for engaging in 
foreign direct investment. Companies FDI engagement can be classified either as market-
seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking or strategic asset-seeking (Dunning, 2000). 
Market-seeking refers increasing sales in a foreign market while resource-seeking refers to the 
access to location-specific advantages ranging from labour to natural resources. Efficiency-
seeking entails possibilities for a more efficient division of labour within a company and 
strategic asset-seeking is guided by the acquisition of ownership-specific assets, for instance 
trademarks or patents. 
Stephan (2006) analyzes the motives of foreign investors over the whole CEE region. He finds 
that overall, market-seeking investment dominated at first and was then followed by more and 
more efficiency-seeking investors. The market-seeking aspect was dominant before EU 
accession and in its early phase in order to secure market share at an early point in time. The 
following efficiency-seeking investors were mainly attracted by low labour costs. Raw materials 
and strategic assets played a minor role. Access to raw materials was only relevant in Poland and 
Slovakia, whereas strategic assets only have minor relevance and when they do mainly in the 
form of recognized trademarks (Stephan, 2006). These motivations for FDI clearly show 
expectations of growth in these markets and low labour costs compared to most other EU 
countries as drivers of FDI. 
For Estonia, the motivations of investors have also been much discussed. Hunya (2001) finds 
that market-seeking investment is unlikely to be a significant factor due to the small country size 
and the small size of the Baltic market. This is seen as a hindrance to sufficient economies of 
scale in plants and supply chains which are possible in larger CEE countries such as Poland. The 
view that market-seeking FDI is not a significant motivation for investors is however not 
supported by survey evidence. Several investor surveys carried out between 1997 and 2000 
identify 65% of foreign investors as market-seeking. 
2.1.3. The multinational enterprise and ownership-specific assets 
Multinational enterprises typically possess superior knowledge compared to domestic firms. 
They provide 80% of all private funds made available worldwide for research and development 
and hold a majority of patents in the high-tech sector (Dunning, 1993). As countries are 
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increasingly shifting their activities towards higher value-added activities in order to increase 
competitiveness, tapping into this pool of research is becoming increasingly important. 
The principal reason why MNE entry is expected to have a potential positive effect on host 
country firms arises from this superior knowledge of the MNE. To describe this knowledge, 
Hymer (1960) coined the term firm-specific advantage to include superior technology, 
economies of scale and advanced organizational techniques. Dunning (1981) incorporated the 
firm-specific advantages as ownership-specific advantages into the eclectic paradigm of 
international production. Both Hymer (1960) and Dunning (1981) base their concepts on 
transaction cost theory aiming to explain under which circumstances firms choose to internalize 
activities. Dunning (1981) however embeds the theory with locational and internationalization 
advantages into the eclectic paradigm as drivers of international production. Ownership specific 
advantages can be treated as the incorporation of firm specific advantages in to the broader 
theory of the eclectic paradigm, also referred to as the OLI framework. 
Ownership advantages can arise from property rights, advantages of common governance and 
institutional assets (Dunning, 1981). By definition, ownership advantages are always intangible 
assets  such as the experience in different fields of activity. Property rights consist for instance of 
rights to the use of specific technology or patents held by the firm. Advantages of common 
governance refer to advantages due to the existing networks and accumulated size of the MNE 
such as economies of scale or a relatively better bargaining position. Institutional assets include 
corporate culture and management systems (Dunning and Lundan, 2008).  
In contrast to locational and internalization advantages, ownership specific advantages by 
definition consist of intangible assets. Here, the concept of knowledge capital can be used for 
specificity. The term knowledge capital broadly encompasses all firm specific, intangible assets 
which are present in a firm. It has been defined as ”a broad term which includes the human 
capital of the employees; patents, blueprints, procedures, and other proprietary knowledge, and 
finally marketing assets such as trademarks, reputations, and brand names.”  (Markusen, 2004, 
p.9). These ownership-specific advantages grant MNEs an advantage relative to host country 
firms. 
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Potential beneficial effects to domestic firms arise from the possibility of parts of these 
advantages being transferred or leaking to firms in the host country. Not all advantages can 
potentially be transferred because some are dependent on factors that cannot be easily replicated 
such as firm size or home country characteristics of the MNE. Some benefits from the 
exploitation of these advantages are however assumed to not be fully captured by the MNE and 
hence leak to domestic firms as spillovers.  
The possession of ownership specific assets is the core of the MNE business model. Ownership 
specific advantages enable the MNE to go abroad and their exploitation provides a source for its 
growth internationally. However, since intangible assets are non-rival in their use. As a result, 
MNEs take action to prevent the diffusion of these assets. 
MNCs use a variety of different measures to limit knowledge diffusion. First and foremost is the 
formal protection of intellectual property rights. MNCs are influenced in their choice of location 
by the protection of intellectual property granted by host country institutions (Javorcik, 2004). 
Several studies show that MNCs pay higher wages in order to decrease worker mobility and 
hence the possible diffusion of their ownership-specific assets (Aitken et al, 1996; Girma, et al 
2001). They may also choose to operate in locations where a low level technical knowledge in 
domestic firms makes it unlikely that domestic enterprises will be able to imitate their 
technology. This is based on a view that low absorptive capacity will limit technology diffusion.  
2.2. Direct effects, indirect effects and pecuniary effects of FDI 
2.2.1. Direct effects and indirect effects of foreign direct investment 
Chapter 2.2. discusses the means through which MNEs affect the development of domestic firms 
in the host country. In the last chapter, we stated that potential benefits for domestic firms arise 
from the ownership-specific advantages of MNEs. More specifically, the superior knowledge of 
MNEs over domestic firms constitutes an ownership-specific advantage which may potentially 
be fully or partially transferred to domestic companies. The terms knowledge, technology, 
transfer and spillover are not used in a coherent way in the literature with many studies failing to 
properly distinguish them (Smeets, 2008).  
We define technology in this respect as a subset of knowledge, which is broader as it 
incorporates not only tangible but also intangible assets. The term spillover effect specifically 
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refers to the broad definition of knowledge. We distinguish the terms transfer and spillover by 
the question whether they are intentional following Javorcik (2004). Knowledge or technology 
transfer is the result of a conscious action taken by the MNE to diffuse its ownership-specific 
assets which involves compensation for the assets transferred. In contrast, knowledge or 
technology spillovers are the unintentional diffusion of assets for which the MNE is not 
compensated. Both benefits through transfers and spillovers also need to be distinguished from 
pecuniary externalities of FDI which are discussed in chapter 2.3. 
Next, we discuss the concepts of direct effects and spillover effects of FDI. Both are means by 
which foreign direct investment affects the performance of domestic firms. The distinction 
between these mechanisms lies in the companies which are affected by them. Direct effects of 
FDI are the results of foreign investment in a company on the performance of that specific 
company. In contrast, indirect effects occur in domestically owned companies because of contact 
with foreign-owned companies. We follow Damijan et al (2003) in our definition of direct 
effects, which is identical with the term own-firm effect also used in the literature. The terms 
spillover effects and indirect effects are also used interchangeably. Pecuniary effects are 
discussed in chapter 2.3. 
These are the basic concepts in the field which have remained consistent in their use from the 
first studies of spillover effects (Caves, 1974; Globerman 1979) to the most recent. The approach 
to the study of both direct and indirect effects of FDI has stayed similar since these early studies. 
FDI is expected to have an effect on the productivity of domestic firms. To assess this effect, 
foreign ownership (in the case of direct effects) or foreign concentration in a sector (in the case 
of indirect effects) is related to the productivity of firms. If a difference in productivity between 
foreign and domestically owned firms is observed this provides evidence for a direct effect of 
FDI. A change in the productivity of domestic firms dependent on foreign concentration in the 
sector provides evidence for an indirect effect of FDI. 
Later extensions of the basic framework have not deviated much from this basic approach. The 
limitation of this approach is evident. While it possible to measure the correlation of foreign 
direct investment and productivity, the specific means by which these effects cannot be 
disentangled in these basic studies. This problem has become known as the “black box” of FDI 
spillovers (Görg and Strobl, 2005). This is despite the existence of broad theoretical knowledge 
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about the channels through which FDI leads to knowledge spillovers. These different channels 
are the discussed in the next section including the more recent studies which have attempted to 
distinguish knowledge spillovers occurring through different channels. 
In contrast to indirect effects, the mechanisms by which direct effects affect firm performance 
are more clear-cut. As direct effects are the effects of MNEs on local affiliates, they are expected 
to emerge because of the insertion of new capital, knowledge and technology by the parent 
company (Hanousek et al, 2011). This of course requires that a foreign investor possesses 
ownership-specific assets which make it superior to domestic firms (Tytell and Yudaeva, 2005). 
Hence, direct effects are a result of the actions taken by an MNE on a firm in which it has 
ownership. MNEs may also influence other firms to a significant extent for instance through 
providing technical assistance. This would however not be defined as a direct effect of FDI as 
the ownership of the firm remains domestic. 
It should be noted that besides FDI three other mechanisms can be identified through which 
knowledge spillover may occur. These are licensing, trade, and non-equity forms of cooperation. 
FDI is however regarded as the most relevant way in which technology transfer as a significant 
element of knowledge takes place (Jindra, 2005). Licensing provides less potential gains as most 
developed technology is typically not available for licensing (UNCTAD, 2000). As ownership of 
superior firm-specific assets is the core of its business model, MNEs are unlikely to license their 
at least their current knowledge due to high cost of potential unauthorized use of it. 
Trade and non-equity forms of cooperation on the other hand occur mostly between MNC 
affiliates in different countries, thereby limiting the extent of potential technology transfer 
(Meyer, 2003). In this case, benefits to domestic enterprises are unlikely to emerge as domestic 
companies simply do not get into contact with the superior knowledge of the MNE. The 
potentially even negative effect of the creation of such “enclave economies” of foreign-owned 
companies has been empirically shown (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996).  
Spillover effects of foreign direct investment can be separated into vertical and horizontal 
spillovers. Horizontal spillovers are processes that occur within one industry (intra-industry) 
while vertical spillovers take place between different sectors (inter-industry). The specific 
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mechanisms through which knowledge spillovers are expected to occur are discussed in the 
following sub-chapter 2.2.1. and 2.2.2.  
2.2.1. Horizontal Spillovers 
Four different mechanisms through which horizontal spillovers operate have been identified in 
the literature. These are imitation effects, competition effects, labour market effects and export 
spillovers (Görg and Greenaway, 2001). 
Imitation effects refer to any processes or products that domestic enterprises mimic after it has 
been introduced through FDI. The scope of emulation can vary between minor elements and full 
copying of products for instance by reverse engineering. More broadly, this effect is also often 
referred to as the demonstration-imitation effect. Positive effects do not necessarily involve 
direct imitation, but foreign enterprises may through demonstration decrease the uncertainty 
which domestic companies perceive about using an innovation (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2000). 
As a result, they may employ some element observed in foreign companies into their operations. 
Competition effects create spillovers through intensifying the established market divisions 
between competitors often found in imperfectly functioning markets. Increasing rivalry forces 
enterprises to increase efficiency, potentially also leading to exit of some firms and increasing 
overall market efficiency. Greater competitive pressure may provide incentives for technological 
upgrading and the introduction of new organizational techniques. As a result, overall efficiency 
of the market may be increased.  
Labour market effects refer benefits of labour mobility and to changes in the overall wage level 
in a sector. MNEs have a strong incentive to pay higher than average wages in order to limit 
worker fluctuation and with it dissemination of the organizational knowledge. As a result, they 
may pay higher wages and thereby create a need for domestic enterprise to increase salaries as 
well. In contrast to wage effects, the effect through labour mobility applies to both horizontal and 
vertical relationships. When MNEs do not fully restrict worker mobility, the movement of 
workers from MNEs to domestic companies may increase domestic company efficiency, thereby 
creating a spillover effect through knowledge transfer. Finally, export spillovers occur when 
domestic enterprises begin exporting their goods as a result of skills they have learned from 
MNEs. Due to their experience of international operations, MNEs typically have much 
experience in this field including knowledge about market access, network structures and 
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political influence. They may diffuse some of their information through two different 
mechanisms. First, they may create necessary transportation links internationally which can then 
also be used by domestic companies. Second, if some of their knowledge about international 
markets is diffused to local companies the market entry costs for these are lowered, thereby 
making export more feasible (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). 
While these are the theoretical mechanisms through which horizontal spillovers in an industry 
are expected to occur, in practice it is possible that horizontal spillovers are either difficult to 
find or have  an overall negative effect. This is due to the interaction between the positive 
externalities due to the diffusion of MNE tangible and intangible assets and the negative 
externalities of increased rivalry. At the horizontal level, increased rivalry because of foreign 
entry may harm domestic enterprises to a more significant extent than any positive externalities 
created by foreign presence.  
2.2.3. Vertical spillovers 
As vertical spillovers occur across industries, the interaction between firms and hence the 
possible kinds of spillovers are different from horizontal ones. Vertical spillovers consist of 
forward and backward linkages. Forward linkages refer to dowstream effects of MNE presence. 
These are effects from suppliers to users of an MNE product. The performance of client firms in 
the host economy may be positively influenced through principally three different channels. 
First, sales of products to upstream firms may increase the performance of these firms and 
possible outsourcing activity creates additional demand for their services. For instance, 
downstream firms may profit from employing an innovation in their production made available 
by MNE presence. Second, due to MNE presence franchise and maintenance activities may 
emerge in the final goods sector, thereby creating additional opportunities for domestic firms. 
Hence, domestic upstream firms benefit as a demand for services is created through MNE 
presence which can be supplied by these firms. 
Third, through improved infrastructure and services downstream firms may benefit from MNE 
presence. In this way, potential benefits of MNE presence arise from more favorable overall 
economic conditions which are conducive to business activity. Foreign companies may either 
themselves invest in infrastructure, or more likely use their political leverage to push for 
infrastructure improvement. This may be in various areas such as transport or communication. 
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Also, the presence of foreign firms with may make additional services such as specific finances 
and accounting companies available to domestic firms as well. In this case, increased demand by 
MNEs increases demand for these services so that they can viably be operated in the host 
country. There is some reason to assume that forward linkages have become more significant 
because of the development in products supplied by MNEs. Increasingly highly sophisticated 
products may make more intensive customer contact necessary (Blomström, 1991). 
Backward linkages in contrast are downstream effects of FDI through links of MNEs with 
supplying sector firms. They include technical assistance to domestic suppliers, assistance in 
purchasing policy and customer acquisition, as well as, assistance in training of management 
staff (Lall, 1980). Labour moving from MNEs to upstream suppliers also is a clearly 
distinguishable means of knowledge transfer. Additionally, suppliers in upstream sector can also 
profit from FDI presence through market effects such as increased demand for intermediate 
inputs. Hence, backward linkage effects can cover both effects of direct action by the MNE and 
the indirect effects of MNE presence on goods supplied by upstream firms. 
There are several reasons to assume that spillovers are more likely to take place between 
different industries. The strong incentive for companies to limit knowledge transfer to 
competitors may be a reason why intra-sectoral spillovers are often found to be insignificant or 
negative. MNCs do not have to fear competition from firms which do not operate at the same 
level of production but in up- and downstream sectors and hence may take less rigid measures to 
limit spillovers. More importantly, MNCs even have strong incentives to assist their suppliers in 
upstream industries through providing technical and financial aid in order to assure quality 
standards of the products supplied and lower prices. Hence, the firms may transfer knowledge in 
order to obtain lower supply prices, thereby attaining a private benefit. However, a social benefit 
may emerge when MNCs are unable to reap all the benefits of their action (Blalock and Gertler, 
2008).  
This assistance can be either in the form of direct transfer of knowledge or high quality 
requirements leading to productivity increases in the suppliers. Both mechanisms have been 
observed in the CEE. The likelihood of spillover effects through this channel is also increased by 
several related mechanisms. In order to avoid holdout problems, MNEs are likely to grant 
assistance to several suppliers. By doing so, the MNE frees itself from the risk of becoming 
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dependent on one partner. As a consequence, knowledge spreads to more companies and 
spillovers become more likely (Blalock and Gertler, 2004). 
2.3. Pecuniary effects of foreign direct Investment 
Since its beginning, the study of spillover effects through FDI has largely limited itself to 
studying the correlation between foreign concentration in a sector and the effect on productivity 
of domestic firms. The previous sections have described these mechanisms through which 
traditionally FDI effects have been studied. This approach strongly limits the effects of FDI 
which can be observed as it is based on a very limited view of the implications of foreign direct 
investment for the host economy. Effects of FDI on the host economy are expected to only occur 
through foreign enterprises transferring knowledge to domestic firms and this transfer resulting 
in changes in the domestic firm production function. However, foreign entry in itself has an 
effect on the structure of the industry in which it operates. The entry of an MNE affects supply 
and demand conditions, as well as, competition within the industry, thereby exerting influence on 
the conditions under which domestic firms operate. 
The distinction between direct effects, spillover effects and pecuniary externalities is the way in 
which they affect domestic enterprises. Direct and indirect effects are the results of actual an 
actual transfer or spillover of tangible and intangible assets between firms. In contrast, pecuniary 
externalities firms affect each other indirectly through the changes the prices of goods on the 
market. While direct effects and spillover effects affect the production function through 
knowledge transfer, pecuniary externalities affect the profit function of firms in an industry 
through cost reductions or revenue increases (Görg and Strobl, 2004). 
Hence, pecuniary externalities affect competitive conditions within an industry. Kugler (2000) 
identifies two mechanisms through which this may occur, namely managerial incentives and 
selection effect. These effects occur at the intra-industry level upon entry of an MNE. First, 
increased competition may raise the managerial incentives to increase efficiency in domestic 
firms in order to prevent the loss of market share. For instance, firms may upgrade technology or 
introduced new organizational structures. Second, increased competition may lead to a selection 
effect as inefficient firms are forced to leave the market as a result of increased competition. As a 
result, overall efficiency in the market is increased but the number of domestic firms in the 
market may be reduced. 
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However, pecuniary externalities may also have a beneficial effect for domestic firm 
development. In theory, this effect occurs through the increased demand for intermediate 
products caused by MNE entry. The increased demand changes the price for intermediate 
products and thereby affect firm profitability, an effect which is recognized for instance in 
Kugler (2000). The theoretical literature on FDI has only recently focused more on this aspect. 
The simple mechanism of increased demand for intermediates is expanded in papers by 
Markusen and Venables (1999) and Rodriguez-Clare (1996). Both show at the theoretical level 
that pecuniary externalities may in fact overall be beneficial for domestic firm development.  
The theoretical framework by Markusen and Venables (1999) lays out the theory of the effect of 
foreign direct investment on the development of local firms which we sketch out briefly. The 
entry of an MNE in a sector is expected to have two consequences. First, foreign presence may 
harm domestic firms through increased product market competition. Second, the increased 
demand by foreign companies may have a positive effect on firms in the supplying sector. The 
increased demand increases profits for existing supplier sector firms while facilitating the entry 
of new ones. Under economies of scale in production, prices of intermediate goods decrease. 
This in turn makes conditions for entry of new domestic firms in the downstream sector in which 
the MNE is present more favourable. Hence, this process would cause local industrial 
development in the form of new firm entry. Markusen and Venables show that it may even lead 
to the displacement of MNEs by domestic firms (Markusen and Venables, 1999). 
The positive effect of FDI on local industrial development through pecuniary externalities has 
also been discussed in two other theoretical papers. Equally to Markusen and Venables (1999), 
these papers also expect the effect on local industrial development to be caused by the increased 
demand for intermediate inputs as a result of MNE entry. However, both differ in the elements of 
local industrial development emphasized. Rivera-Batiz (1990) predicts an increase in the 
domestic firm entry rate but emphasizes the benefits caused by an increased range of 
intermediate goods available. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) also sees a greater selection of specialized 
inputs as the main benefit of increased demand for intermediates. 
As noted earlier, the potential effects of FDI on the domestic firm structure has not been much 
researched. Besides the studies mentioned above which extend the classic approach of studying 
productivity effects, the only other field which has contributed to this discussion is the industrial 
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organization and occupational choice literature. The few studies available in this field show a 
negative effect of FDI on the development of domestic firms and relate it to changes in 
individual professional choices. Although these studies are built on a different theoretical base, 
they also discuss the relationship between FDI and the foundation of new domestic firms.  
Grossman (1984) argues that FDI entry reduces domestic firm entry through changing the 
incentives for those who potentially would found companies. The argument is that FDI reduces 
prices in a sector, thereby decreasing the potential benefits of entrepreneurial activity while 
creating employment opportunities in MNEs. As a result, potential entrepreneurs choose to be 
employed instead of starting a company. DeBacker and Sleuwaegen (2002) also posit a negative 
effect of FDI on domestic firm entry through crowding out effects on product and labour 
markets. In fact, industries with high entry barriers may attract FDI because MNEs through their 
ownership-specific advantages are able to overcome these barriers more easily than domestic 
companies. As a result, entry barriers for domestic firms increase further through MNE entry and 
domestic entry in the sector declines. 
In essence, both Grossman (1984) and DeBacker and Sleuwaegen both predict a decrease in the 
domestic firm entry rate as a result of competition effects within a sector. Despite the different 
theoretical background, these studies hence are in line with the studies of pecuniary externalities 
mentioned earlier. These two studies simply discuss specific aspects of competition effect 
focusing on crowding out of domestic firms on the labour market. Hence, the final effect of 
pecuniary externalities on domestic firms depends on the interaction between competition effects 
on one side and beneficial effects through increased demand on the other. At the intra-industry 
level, a decrease in the domestic firm entry rate would be an indication that competition effects 
dominate. If however the beneficial effects through changes in demand and prices dominate, we 
would expect a positive effect on the domestic firm entry rate. This would be a possible 
indication that FDI may lead to local industrial development. 
2.3.4. Other factors influencing the occurrence of spillover effects  
Additionally to the factors previously discussed, there are some additional determinants which 
are frequently discussed in the spillover literature. Partly, they clearly are particularly related to 
the application in developing countries while others remain valid in the developed country 
context. 
22 
 
The extent to which the ownership structure of a host country MNE affiliate affects the 
occurrence of spillover effects has been much analyzed. Joint ownership may be beneficial to 
spillovers for two reasons. Domestic firms in a sector may have easier access to knowledge in 
joint ventures projects, also because knowledge transferred to such projects is often less 
sophisticated. Also, joint venture projects may more easily find local suppliers and hence source 
more inputs locally, thereby increasing the likelihood of vertical spillovers (Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2008). The studies available indicate that indeed joint ownership is more likely to 
generate positive spillovers to the host economy. Aitken and Harrison (1999) show joint 
ownership to be beneficial in the Venezuelan manufacturing sector. The positive effect of joint 
ownership on productivity is also confirmed by Dimelis and Louri (2007) for Greece. 
The extent of local sourcing also has an important influence on spillover effects. MNCs with 
little local sourcing can create “enclave economies”. There is significant evidence that these self-
detained agglomerations in host countries hinder local development (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). 
When MNCs integrate into existing networks, increased demand through local sourcing can lead 
to greater economies of scale in local suppliers, thereby making their production more efficient. 
Additionally, local connections open up this channel of potential spillovers also to other kinds of 
spillovers such as dissemination of knowledge through worker mobility. Evidence however 
shows that MNCs tend to source much of their inputs locally. This observation is coherent with 
the theory of the firm which states that cheaper sourcing of intermediates is one of the possible 
drivers of the decision to invest abroad.  
The question of the influence of a technological gap between foreign MNEs and the local 
economy also remains current. This is due to the great importance that host countries attach to 
the possibility of technology transfer. This can be seen especially in the developed country 
context where joint venture requirements are commonplace. This issue has however also been 
discussed in the industrialized country context, where research more commonly refers to the 
absorptive capacity of local firms. A higher absorptive capacity implies more likely technology 
transfer.  
Two opposing views exist on the relationship between technological gap and spillover effects. 
For instance Findlay (1978) argues that a larger technological gap is beneficial to spillovers as it 
offers ample opportunities for development. In this scenario, backwardness creates a more urgent 
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need for progress and implementation produces large results, thereby resulting in increased 
spillovers. However, overall the argument that a certain technological level is needed for 
domestic firms to be able to adopt MNE technology is more justifiable. This is also confirmed by 
the majority of studies on this aspect which find that the likelihood of technological spillovers is 
greater with a smaller technology gap (Glass and Saggi, 1998; Girma et al, 2001). If domestic 
firms are too far behind technologically, they will not be able to absorb spillover effects nor 
receive assistance for upgrading as part of a MNE supplier network. 
The overall effect of all different kinds of horizontal and vertical spillovers may be positive or 
negative. For instance in the case of competition effects, long-run sustainability through 
increased efficiency may come at the expense of negative impact on domestic firms in the short 
run. Wage spillovers can also be negative exerting downward pressure on wages. The currently 
existing studies provide inconclusive results as they show both positive and negative effects in 
developed and developing countries (Aitken et al, 1996; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2001). 
Besides effects on the host country, effects of FDI in the MNC home country have been 
researched but to a much more limited extent. There are several channels through which outward 
FDI potentially influences the home country. Domestic enterprises may profit from learning how 
to operate internationally, secure access to raw materials and gain access to foreign assets such as 
capital markets (Buckley et al, 2007). Furthermore, there is evidence for a positive effect on the 
productivity of enterprises which engage in outward FDI, as Damijan et al (2007) show for 
Slovenia and Vahter and Masso (2006) for Estonia. Outward FDI also has potential negative 
home country effects. These may occur for instance due to potential job losses if production is 
shifted. These effects are relevant as they may influence the FDI flows for instance through 
policy measures in MNE home countries. This paper however is limited to the effects of foreign 
direct investment on host countries. 
2.3. Literature Review: Previous studies of FDI spillovers 
2.3.1. Horizontal spillover effects 
The study of spillover effects began with the assessment of horizontal effects. The first 
contribution directly to the effects of FDI on host economies dates back to Caves (1974) study 
assessing the correlation between FDI and productivity. The Caves study searches for evidence 
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on competition effects which are expected to increase firm selection in an industry and force 
technological upgrading while also assessing other channels of technology transfer. The general 
ideas of this study still remain valid for current ones and numerous studies have been based on it. 
In another early study in this field, Globerman (1979) confirms the positive correlation of FDI on 
labour productivity, also for the manufacturing sector in Canada like Caves. The Globerman 
(1979) study is typical for much of the literature on FDI spillovers in its approach of measuring 
correlations between productivity in a sector and a measure of foreign enterprise presence in that 
sector. Since then, different studies assessing externalities of FDI have refined and used different 
measures of productivity and concentration while maintaining to a great degree the same 
theoretical assumptions about their interaction. 
The two pioneering studies are exceptional because they both study developed economies. After 
these studies, the research focus of intra-industry studies to a very large degree shifted to the 
developing world. The selection of countries followed investment flows as most countries 
studies can be considered emerging economies. Examples are Mexico (Blomström, 1986; 
Kokko, 1996), Indonesia (Sjöholm 1999), Morocco (Haddad and Harrison, 1993) and Venezuela 
(Aitken and Harrison, 1999). A comprehensive overview can be found in Görg and Greenaway 
(2004). 
The findings of these studies are very much correlated with the research methodology employed. 
Besides the studies by Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) all studies 
up to 1999 use cross-sectional data instead of panel data. Generally, the evidence for spillover 
effects tends to be weaker using panel data which we is also confirmed for Central and Eastern 
European transition economies in section 2.3.5. While Haddad and Harrison (1993) find 
inconclusive evidence of spillovers, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find negative effects while the 
remaining studies mentioned find positive effects based on cross-sectional data. This finding is 
also corroborated by other cross-sectional studies finding evidence for spillovers (Chuang and 
Lin, 1999) and panel studies finding no effects (Görg and Strobl, 2002). 
The correlation between research methodology and findings holds for transition economies (see 
section 2.3.5.) while it does not hold for other developed countries. Several studies using panel 
data find significant evidence for horizontal spillovers in developed countries (Haskel et al, 
2002, in the United Kingdom; Dimelis and Louri, 1997 in Greece). 
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Several factors may explain the fact that panel data studies overall tend to show less evidence of 
spillover effects. In developed countries, evidence of spillover effects is strong enough for 
significant results to be found also in panel data studies.  The use of panel data studies is likely to 
generate more valid results. They allow a single firm to be tracked over a longer time period of 
time instead of simply selecting one moment for observation. Through observation over a longer 
time period, medium- and long-term effects of FDI are made observable. Additionally, through 
observation over time cross-sectional data makes it possible to control for factors which 
potentially affect foreign investment (Görg and Strobl, 2001). The identification problem and 
establishing causality between firm performance and FDI in a sector is key issue in the study of 
spillover effects.  
If an industry with greater foreign presence shows better performance compared to another 
industry, it is without additional information not possible to establish whether there is causality. 
Foreign investment may have increased performance, but better-performing industries may also 
attract more foreign investment. Use of panel data makes it possible to observe the development 
of both performance measures and FDI over time, thereby providing an indication of their order. 
While this provides more credible results, it does not provide evidence of causality. Hence, 
studies in the field clearly delineate that they establish correlations between foreign presence in a 
sector and the effect on the host country firms instead of referring to causality between the two. 
Overall, evidence for horizontal effects remains weak particularly in developing countries and 
transition economies inconclusive or negative spillovers effects are found. Likely, competition 
effects play an important role in explaining this result. While there may be a positive effect of 
foreign investment, Domestic increased competition on the horizontal level likely creates an 
overall negative effect for domestic firms. 
2.3.2. Vertical spillover effects  
An important extension to the research methodology on FDI spillovers was the extension of 
research to inter-industry spillovers. Most of the FDI spillover literature focuses only on intra-
industry spillovers and only later have researchers started to assess spillovers between industries. 
After the pioneering study by Lall (1980) assessing vertical linkages in least developed countries 
this issue was not significantly further developed. Javorcik (2004) revived the interest in vertical 
spillovers with her study of the Lithuanian manufacturing industry. 
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In its simplest form, vertical spillover effects simply employ the methodology of horizontal 
studies but link different sectors of the economy according to supply relationships between them. 
Supply relationships between sectors are typically established through input-output tables for the 
whole economy. The evidence for vertical linkages generally is much stronger than for 
horizontal ones. Evidence for backward linkages has tended to be much stronger than for 
forward linkages. However, there are differences in the extent to which vertical spillover effects 
are found in countries at different stages of development. A relatively larger number of studies 
have been published for transition economies compared to both developing and developed 
economies. However, the total number of studies which measures spillover effects between 
sectors is significantly smaller than for intra-industry effects. 
For transition economies, there are several studies showing vertical spillover effects. Particularly 
evidence for backward linkages is found in several studies. Also, when assessing all of the CEE, 
evidence for backward linkages if present is found to be ten times more important than 
horizontal linkages (Damijan et al, 2003). Backward linkages for the manufacturing sectors are 
found for Lithuania, Hungary Romania (Javorcik, 2004; Halpern and Muraközy, 2007; Schoors 
and van der Tol, 2002; Smarzynska and Spatareanu 2004). Only one study finds significant 
evidence of forward linkages (Schoors and and van der Tol, 2002). The relatively greater 
importance of backward linkages Hence, for transition economies there is evidence that 
especially spillovers through backward linkages exist. However, more recent CEE wide data 
shows that vertical linkages may in fact have become less important than horizontal ones 
(Damijan et al, 2008). Particularly given the currently relatively low number of studies, more 
upcoming research will help to clarify more exactly the relative importance of vertical spillover 
effects.  
For both developing and developed countries less research has been published on vertical 
spillover effects. Studies for developing countries exclusively show evidence of backward 
linkages. These are observed in panel studies of Colombia and Indonesia (Kugler, 2001; Blalock 
and Gertler, 2003). In developed countries, the number of studies on vertical spillovers is even 
more limited and does not make it possible to derive a pattern from it. Driffield (2002) finds a 
positive forward linkage effect in the UK while Girma et al (2001b) finds a backward linkage 
effect but only for domestic firms with much export activity. Harris and Robinson (2004) assess 
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backward and forward linkage effects in 20 different sectors of the UK manufacturing sector for 
the period 1974-1995. Across different industries, the study does not reveal a clearly 
distinguishable pattern across industries as positive, negative and insignificant results for vertical 
spillover effects are found. 
2.3.3. Pecuniary effects of foreign direct Investment 
In contrast to the relatively large number of studies on the effects of FDI on productivity, the 
pecuniary externalities of FDI have been discussed to a much more limited extent. In the 
available studies the focus is mostly on the effect of FDI on domestic firm entry. The results are 
mixed and strongly depend on the study approach taken. 
The first approach is the Markusen and Venables (1999) framework. Despite considerable 
interest in the theory so far few studies applying the framework exist. A reason may be the 
highly specific requirements that the framework poses for its application. The framework has 
only been applied to a transition country in the study by Altomonte and Resmini (2002) for the 
manufacturing sector in Poland between 1990 and 1998. Their application follows closely the 
theoretical framework but extends it to include MNE entry from the final goods to the 
intermediate goods sector. They find that while MNE presence promotes the development of 
domestic firms through backward and forward linkages, there is not sufficient evidence for self-
sustaining local industrial development. 
Several studies in the Irish manufacturing sector also build on the Markusen and Venables 
framework to examine FDI effects on local industrial development. They do however not 
specifically test for the emergence of a self-sustaining pattern of domestic firm development. 
These studies assess the effect of FDI on the entry rate of domestic firms (Görg and Strobl, 2002; 
Barrios et al 2004), as well as, survival and growth (Görg and Strobl, 2004) using plant level 
data. The studies all find a positive correlation between foreign concentration in a sector and 
domestic firm entry. Up until a threshold of approximately 20% of foreign concentration in a 
sector, competition effects however outweigh positive effects of FDI on firm entry (Barrios et al, 
2004). Foreign presence increases the chances of plant survival in high-technology sectors while 
also reducing domestic firm growth (Görg and Strobl, 2004). Fotopoulus and Louri (2004) also 
use the Markusen and Venables framework to assess domestic firm growth instead of entry. 
They find that a positive correlation is present in sectors with higher than average growth rates. 
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The finding that benefits accrue mainly in technologically advanced sectors is corroborated for 
the number of domestic firms in the Czech Republic, showing that the benefits of FDI for 
domestic firms dominate over the market-stealing effect (Kosova 2003).  Contrary results are 
sparse. In a cross-sectional study of Belgium from 1990 to 1995, DeBacker and Sleuwaegen 
(2002) find that the entry of domestic decreased following foreign direct investment in a sector. 
Therefore the vast majority of studies hence find a positive relationship between foreign 
concentration and the creation of new domestic firms.  
2.3.5. Previous empirical studies in the CEE and Estonia 
A few studies have been carried out on FDI linkage effects in Estonia including those which 
include Estonia as one of several countries. A majority of studies focuses on horizontal spillover 
effects within one industry. Overall, the evidence for spillover effects is mixed, with many 
studies not finding significant spillover effects. 
The most extensive studies of spillovers in the CEE have been the studies by Damijan et al 
(2001; 2003). Both studies examine firm level data from eight CEE countries with the later study 
using a larger number of firms. 8,000 firms in ten CEE transition countries are assessed in this 
panel study. For Estonia, they find statistically significant results only for direct spillover effects 
of FDI. There is no evidence for positive or negative effects through linkages. Overall, for all 
CEE countries evidence for horizontal, forward and backward linkages is very limited with 
significant results found only for a minority of countries and indicators. Moreover, coefficients 
in some cases do not carry the expected signs but the authors but this may be caused by small 
sample size for several countries.  In an extension of the study somewhat stronger evidence is 
found when firm-specific effects have been explicitly controlled for (Damijan et al, 2008). 
However, overall the results remain mixed without consistent patterns across countries or types 
of spillover effects.  
These studies remain the only ones which cover the whole CEE region. All other studies are 
significantly smaller and only include a subset of countries, e.g. Poland, Bulgaria and Romania 
as for instance in Konings et al (2001). As an additional research methodology, meta-analysis of 
existing studies has recently been used. Hereby, existing studies are drawn together and analyzed 
despite different individual results in between them in order to find commonalities through 
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pooling them. An example of this new approach is the study by Hanousek et al (2011). This 
study however also finds only weak evidence for spillover effects. They note that this may be 
due to the simultaneous evolution of FDI effects and spillover methodologies. Increased effects 
of foreign investment can be expected from more recent studies because they had more time to 
develop, but at the same time more recent studies use panel data instead of cross-sectional data 
techniques which tend to show lower results. Hence, in the end evidence for spillover effects 
remains weak (Hanousek et al, 2011).  Looking at all of the CEE, evidence for spillover remains 
relatively weak and inconsistent across different study methodologies.  
Next, we assess the available studies focusing specifically on the Estonian economy. Since the 
first study in 2004, these have gradually evolved in research methodology. The earlier studies of 
Sinani and Meyer (2004) and Damijan and Knell (2005) are limited in their interpretability due 
to specific methodological issues. Sinani and Meyer use panel data for 405 firms initially, while 
Damijan and Knell use a panel study of 1,454 firms. Both studies use small datasets biased 
towards large firms for their analyses, while the study by Sinani and Meyer (2004) additionally 
shows attrition problems as the number of firms decreases significantly during the study period 
(Vahter, 2010). These studies do not measure the causal relationship between FDI and 
performance but rather correlation between these factors. Sinani and Meyer (2004) find strong 
evidence for both direct and indirect spillover effects while Damijan and Knell (2005) find 
evidence for direct effects. 
These issues are avoided by subsequent studies. Additional studies on spillover effects 
specifically in Estonia have since been conducted by Vahter and Masso (2006), Vahter (2010) 
and Masso et al (2010). All avoid the problem of selection bias through using complete panel 
datasets of Estonian firm. Vahter and Masso (2006) use a database of all 41,000 Estonian firms, 
while Vahter (2010) and Masso et al (2010) use data of all firms in the manufacturing sector. 
Vahter and Masso (2006) and Vahter (2010) find no significant evidence for an effect of FDI on 
productivity. Both Vahter (2010) and Masso et al (2010) however find evidence related to 
innovation. Vahter (2006) finds that innovation is significantly positive increased by FDI in the 
same sector while Masso et al (2010) shows that foreign invested enterprises use knowledge 
sourcing more intensively and face less hindrances in innovation.  
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This study compliments the existing studies. It avoids the issues present in earlier studies and 
adds a complete view of the correlation of FDI and domestic firm performance in Estonia. This 
is achieved through assessing equally direct and indirect effects of FDI both at the horizontal and 
vertical level. A complete picture of spillover effects through FDI within the Estonian 
manufacturing industry is created. Additionally, the relevance of pecuniary externalities has not 
been addressed in previous studies.  
3. Empirical Application 
3.1. Research Question 
Based on the theoretical background described in chapter 2, this paper responds to three 
empirical research questions. These research questions are answered using a model described in 
section 3.3., the data used is described in chapter 4 and the estimation results are presented in 
chapter 5. 
Foreign direct investment can influence a domestic firm directly or indirectly. Effects which 
occur within an enterprise with foreign ownership are considered direct effects (often also 
referred to as own-firm effect). In contrast, indirect effects of FDI are effects of foreign-owned 
firms on domestically-owned firms. The first research question assesses whether firms with 
foreign ownership have higher productivity than domestically-owned firms.  
Research question 1: Is there evidence for a direct effect of foreign ownership on 
domestic firm productivity? 
Next, we assess the evidence for indirect effects of FDI. An indirect effect of FDI would be 
present if foreign concentration in an industry sector is related to the productivity of domestic 
firms in the same sector or in up- or downstream sectors. Indirect effects consist of horizontal 
and vertical linkage effects. Horizontal linkage effects affect the productivity of domestic firms 
in the same sector, while vertical linkage effects affect domestic firms in supplier sectors 
(backward linkage effect) and customer sectors (forward linkage effect). 
Research question 2: Is there evidence for indirect effects of FDI on domestic firm 
productivity? 
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Finally, we assess the link between foreign direct investment and local industrial development. 
Apart from direct and indirect effects as described above, FDI may through its influence on 
market structure affect the entry of new domestic firms. We estimate this relationship by 
assessing the correlation between FDI presence in a sector and the domestic firm entry rate in the 
third research question. 
Research question 3: Is there evidence for an effect of FDI on the development of new 
domestic firms? 
3.2. The development of FDI flows in Estonia 
This study assesses the impact of inward FDI in Estonia. Estonia is a country with 1.4 million 
inhabitants situated in North-Eastern Europe. GDP amounted to 20,608 USD per capita (PPP) in 
2010 (UNCTAD, 2012). After regaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, the 
country has shown an unparalleled pace in reforming its economy and re-integrating into the 
global community. Since 2004, Estonia has been a member of the European Union and adopted 
the Euro as its currency in 2011. Estonia is the only EU member state which is practically free of 
sovereign debt. Estonia is also a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Trade Organization. 
The extent of foreign investment received by Estonia since its economic opening has been 
immense. From the beginning 1990s until 1997, annual investment inflows fluctuated around 
200 million USD yearly, then starting to rise reaching 700 million USD in 1998 (UNCTAD, 
2012). From 1998, the trend has been a rapid rise in FDI inflows albeit with substantial 
fluctuations between different years. In 2005 and 2007, record numbers for FDI inflow were 
recorded at around 2700 million USD. The extent of new foreign investment in Estonia however 
decreased particularly strongly during the financial crisis, falling by 36% between 2007 and 
2008. In 2010, foreign investment inflows were at 1540 million USD (UNCTAD, 2012). In 
2010, the inward FDI stock was 5,700 million USD (UNCTAD, 2012). Since the economic 
opening, Sweden and Finland have constantly been the most important sending countries.  
The magnitude of investment received is also remarkable in comparison with other Central and 
Eastern European transition economies. Since 2003, Estonia has constantly recorded the highest 
per capita inflow in the CEE. In 2010, inward FDI per capita was at 1,148 USD compared to 411 
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USD for Slovenia which received the second highest per capita investments (UNCTAD, 2012). 
Parallel to inward FDI, outward foreign direct investment has increasingly also started to play a 
role. Outward investments grew from 61 million USD in 2000 to 1640 million in 2007 but then 
decreased to 130 million USD in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2012). In the transition to a market economy, 
Estonia among other CEE countries faced the challenge of upgrading the technology stock in 
order to catch-up with global standards and productivity levels. In order to become competitive 
internationally in a market environment, foreign investment provided a potential means to attain 
the capital and knowledge required. 
The Estonian government began early with measures to increase the attractiveness of the country 
to investors. Privatization of formerly state-owned assets in Estonia was enacted quickly and 
with a focus on complete sale to investors instead of sale to company insiders.  This facilitated 
technological upgrading through concentration of ownership. The privatization method offered 
the possibility of the introduction of more efficient corporate governance without the risk of 
insiders blocking restructuring (Konings, 2001).  
Additionally to outsider privatization, state policy focused on a fiscal policy aimed at increasing 
foreign investment. The most characteristic aspect of this approach has been the exclusion of 
reinvested earnings from corporate taxation since 2003. While several CEE countries chose to 
focus on fiscal policy instead of subsidies around the same time, the focus on corporate income 
taxation has remained a distinct feature of Estonian policy (Cass, 2006).  
3.3. Model development 
The development of the econometric models follows the framework given by the research 
questions. First, we develop a model for the direct effects of FDI and then continue to model for 
indirect effects. As a third step, we create a model for the entry of domestic firms. 
The models developed to measure direct and indirect effects of FDI are based on the same Cobb-
Douglas production function approach. Different specifications of this approach have been used 
in much of the FDI spillover literature from the early studies such as Caves (1974) to more 
recent ones since Aitken and Harrison (1999). The basic model is represented as 
 =  + 	
 +	 +	 +  +  +	   (1) 
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The dependent variable  denotes the output of firm i in sector j at time t. The same subscripts 
are used for all variables and throughout the study. We use the logarithms of the production 
inputs for the following model:  
 	 =  + 	
 +	 +	 	+  +  +	            (2) 
The term 
 is the log of fixed assets in the firm, is the log of the number of employees and 
  is the log of material inputs. Fixed assets, material inputs and sales are measured in 
Estonian crowns (EEK) which have been deflated to year 2000 values. The term  is a control 
variable for year-specific effects and  is a control variable for sector-specific effects. The term 
 is the remaining randomly distributed error term. Its properties are discussed in connection 
with the more specific applications. Many previous studies on larger countries in the CEE and 
other regions analyze regions separately (e.g. Altomonte and Resmini, 2002). For Estonia, we do 
not apply this approach given as the small country size makes nationwide supply relationships 
feasible. Hence, assessing regions separately would not reflect real linkages in the economy. 
3.4. Direct effects of FDI 
In order to measure direct effects of FDI, a dummy for foreign ownership is added to our basic 
model: 
	 =  + 	
 +	 +	 	+  +  +  +	     (3) 
The inclusion of   	 as a dummy variable is used to measure the correlation between foreign 
ownership in an enterprise and its effect on productivity. The variable 	 takes the value 1 
if the company is majority foreign-owned or 0 otherwise. Direct effects of foreign direct 
investment are productivity differences in companies which have a foreign direct investment 
stake compared to domestically owned companies. A positive coefficient for the variable  
would indicate that firms with foreign ownership have higher productivity compared to domestic 
firms. A negative coefficient for the variable would indicate lower productivity of firms with 
foreign ownership.  
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3.5. Indirect effects of FDI 
As a next step, this basic model is then extended to include measures of horizontal linkages and 
vertical linkages including both forward and backward linkages.     
	 =  + 	
 +	 +	 + 	 + 
!	 	+ 
             	"!	 +  +  +	                           (4) 
In this full model  measures the concentration of foreign ownership in the same sector. 
The term  
!  measures the cumulative foreign concentration in supplying (upstream) 
sectors. The term ! measures the cumulative foreign concentration in sectors to which 
output is supplied (downstream sectors). These three measures of linkages are specific to 
industry j and time t. We next discuss the way in which they are calculated. 
The variable   measures foreign concentration in a sector based on employment. It is 
calculated as the ratio of employees in foreign-owned firms relative to all employees in the 
industry: 
 =
#$%&'(()	*	+*,$)	-*.ℎ	+&,(*0	&-(,)ℎ*%1.
2&.3	4$5(,&+	($%&'(()	1.
   (5) 
The parameter of the variable    is a measure of the correlation between FDI 
concentration in a sector and domestic firm performance in the same sector. A positive 
coefficient indicates a positive correlation with domestic firm performance while the opposite is 
true for a negative coefficient. We expect the variable to show a negative coefficient as 
competition effects through foreign firms are expected to exert a stronger influence on domestic 
firm productivity than beneficial effects. A possible positive coefficient would indicate that the 
competition effect is overall positive. This could be cause by foreign firms forcing domestic 
firms to upgrade organizational structure or technology 
Vertical linkages are the effects of foreign presence in a sector on domestic firm performance in 
a different sector. We measure and assess the evidence for the extent of backward and forward 
linkages. Backward linkages are the effects of foreign presence in a sector on domestic firm 
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performance in sectors which supply to it. In contrast, Forward linkages are effects of foreign 
presence on domestic firm performance in sectors to which they supply. In order to assess the 
evidence for vertical linkage effects, we need to combine the measures of foreign concentration 
in each sector with the intermediate input supply relationships between different sectors. Using 
these measures, we can define the share of sector output sold to foreign firms and the share of 
input bought from foreign firms. The first mentioned measure refers to backward linkages while 
the latter refers to forward linkages. 
In order to measure backward and forward linkages we use the ratio of output in firms with 
foreign ownership as a share of total output in a sector.  In order to account for the relative 
magnitude of the supply-use relationship the ratio is weighted by the share supplied to a sector. 
In this way, we can include both the extent of the output flow between sectors and the 
concentration of foreign firms in the estimation of forward and backward linkages. This 
specification predicts that backward linkages are expected to increase both with increased 
demand from the using sector and with increased foreign concentration in the producer sector 
(Schors and van der Tol, 2002). It can be noted as: 
 
! = ∑ 	7878  (6) 
! = ∑ 	79878                 (7) 
The letter  denotes the share of inputs supplied by the upstream sector. For each supplier sector, 
the share of inputs received from the sector is multiplied by the foreign concentration in the 
supplier sector measured as   	. This value is calculated for each supplier sector, and 
 
! is the sum of all values for the supplying sectors. The sum for ! is calculated 
analogously taking the measures for all sectors to which output is supplied. The letter 9 denotes 
the share of output supplied to one downstream sector. 
We can use a simple fictional example to illustrate the calculation. There is a wood sector which 
supplies half of its outputs each to the furniture sector and the paper sector. The foreign 
concentration in the wood sector is 0.8, while it is 0.5 in the furniture sector and 0.3 in the paper 
sector. The backward linkage coefficient for the wood sector would be (0.5)(0.5) + (0.5)(0.3) and 
equal 0.4. 
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To define the relationships between sectors we use two-digit input-output tables combined with a 
measure of concentration of foreign ownership in each sector (Blalock, 2003). The input-output 
table accounts for material flows between manufacturing sectors according to two-digit NACE 
classification, hence including sectors 15 to 37. For each manufacturing industry sector, linkages 
with all other manufacturing industry sectors are calculated. 
In the FDI spillover literature there are two dominant approaches to establishing supply-use 
relationships between sectors. The first method is using the share of inputs sourced from the 
domestic economy as the total of inputs used by a firm. However, using this measure clearly 
limits the effects which can be studied. First, only backward linkage effects can be assessed as 
the complete economy is treated as one supplying sector with the foreign firm separated from its 
structure. Second, linkages between different industries can also not be assessed. As a result, the 
limited view of FDI effects on the economy provides little understanding of the mechanisms and 
input for policy formulation.  
The second widely used approach for establishing supply-use relationships is the use of 
economy-wide input output tables. The use of these tables overcomes the limitations caused by 
using ratios of domestic input. There are two considerations for the use of input-output tables. 
First, they are only available at a relatively aggregated level which is typically the two-digit 
NACE level. This means that the precision to which supply-use relationships can be observed is 
limited and poses a common limitation to all studies of FDI effects between industry sectors. 
Supply and use sectors of the economy are also to some extent overlapping as the exchange of 
inputs also occurs between firms in the same sector. Imports and exports of goods are not 
included in the calculation. 
The second consideration in the use of input-output tables relates to the frequency of their 
publishing. For Estonia, the currently available tables are for the year 2000 and 2005. Hence, 
supply and use relationships between sectors are always based on snapshots of the economy but 
do not precisely match the relations for each year. This is a common limitation to all studies in 
this field. Similar model specifications have been used in several studies including Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) and Javorcik (2004). The values for the data of foreign firms in different sectors 
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are lagged by one period as we can expect that correlations of MNE presence will not materialize 
immediately.  
3.6. Domestic Firm Entry 
Next, we construct a model for domestic firm entry in order to assess whether FDI exerts an 
influence on the entry of domestic firms. The research on the effect of FDI on domestic market 
entry conditions has only been analyzed in a very limited number of studies. As a result, 
modeling of entry has also not been discussed much in the FDI literature. Hence, we build our 
model using those studies at the plant level which are available and combining it with literature 
from general microeconomic theory.  
The standard model of firm entry has remained consistent since early studies. The entry decision 
is based on the expected returns which can be achieved in an industry after entry. The expected 
return depends on the sum of incentives and disincentives to market entry. Incentives are the 
expected profit and growth of the industry while disincentives are various entry barriers faced by 
a new entrant. One example of a classic simple firm entry model is Orr (1974) using growth of 
industry output to proxy incentives to entry. We also include industry growth as an explanatory 
variable in our model which is described later. 
As a result, the difference between studies of firm entry is limited to the elements included in 
entry incentives and disincentives and their operationalization. The study by Orr (1974) includes 
past industry profit rate and rate of output growth as incentives while capital requirements, 
advertising costs, R&D intensity, risk of failure and industry concentration are included as entry 
barriers. Shapiro (1987) extends the model by the existence of multi-plant firms as an additional 
entry barrier. Acs and Audretsch (1989) later add union membership of workers as a barrier and 
firm innovation rate as a possible compensation for entry barriers.  
More recent studies also apply models which are structured in a similar way. Some extensions 
include more specific inclusion of costs for financing and size of the market (e.g. Mata, 1993). 
The existing studies on the effects of FDI on domestic firm development use similar measures. 
They typically include sectoral growth rate, industry size, minimum efficient scale of firms and a 
foreign investment proxy (Barrios et al 2004; Görg and Strobl, 2002; Görg and Strobl, 2004). 
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Barrios et al (2004) additionally includes the age of a firm while Görg and Strobl (2004) include 
measures of concentration and industry growth rate. We use a similar model to model firm entry:  
# =  + 	:	 +	;#	 +	#;	 +  < 	 
   	+	 +	  (9) 
The entry rate #	is defined as the net number of indigenous firms entering the NACE two-digit 
sector between time t and t+1 divided by the total number of firms in sector j at time t. The term 
  is the constant. The remaining independent variables are all measured for sector j at time t-1. 
The variables are lagged by one period as we expect a time lag between the observation of the 
sector level characteristics by a potential entrant and the actual entry decision.  
The sector growth rate  : is measured as the rate of net annual output growth in the sector. 
The sectoral growth rate 	: is expected to be positively correlated with domestic firm entry. A 
higher sectoral growth rate implies a higher expected profit rate for the entrant firm. When the 
industry growth rate is higher, the additional supply by the entrant firm is also less likely to 
depress prices in the sector (Orr, 1974b). Therefore, a higher sectoral growth rate may increase 
profit expectations of potential entrants and hence affect domestic firm entry rate. The variable 
;# measures the size of the sector as the log of total employment in the sector. The size of a 
market  ;#  is also expected to be positively correlated with domestic firm entry. Larger 
market size potentially increases the number of firms present in the sector, making incumbents 
less likely to retaliate against a new entrant.  
The minimum efficient scale of a firm #; is measured as the log of mean firm employment 
size in the sector. The minimum efficient scale #;  is included as a measure of the entry 
barrier cause by the minimum size of a firm to enter. The minimum size required to enter is 
expected to influence how many firms may enter the industry given a specific profit signal 
(Mata, 1993). We expect that #;  is negatively correlated with the entry rate. A higher 
minimum scale required increases the cost of entry and creates a greater entry barrier for new 
firms. 
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The firm concentration in a sector  <  is measured by the mean value for the Lerner index 
for each sector. First, the Lerner index is calculated for each manufacturing sector firm. The 
Lerner index is calculated by using sales, material inputs and employment costs for each firm: 
#<# =	
=>?@=ABC	D>@E>?	FGH=ABC		@DG?IJD@F	KI==ABC
=>?@=	ABC
 (10) 
All values are in deflated Estonian kroon (EEK). The Lerner index for each firm can range 
between the values of 0 and 1. The value 0 hence would indicate that a firm has no market 
power while a value of 1 indicates absolute market power. We then take the average Lerner 
index for each year and sector to model   <  . Firm concentration  <  is expected to be 
negatively correlated with firm entry rate. High concentration is expected to be a deterrent to 
entry as incumbent firms are more likely to notice the new entrant and take retaliatory 
measures (Shapiro, 1987). 
As in our previous model of productivity spillover effects,  again measures the foreign 
concentration in a sector as the share of employment in foreign-owned companies relative to 
total employment in the sector as shown in equation (5). If foreign concentration in a sector has 
a positive impact on domestic firm entry  would be positively correlated with the entry 
rate. This would be an indication that foreign entry can serve as a driver of local industrial 
development. In case the coefficient is negative this would imply that competition effects 
dominate and foreign presence in a sector creates higher entry barriers for domestic 
companies.  
3.7. Econometric Considerations 
Three main econometric challenges need to be addressed. These are the selection bias of firms in 
the dataset, the simultaneity bias of firm intermediate inputs and the estimation method for the 
models described in the previous section. These three economic considerations all relate to the 
potential presence of selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity. Sample selection bias refers to 
the non-random selection of firms for foreign investment. Unobserved heterogeneity refers to 
firm-specific characteristics which are not explicitly accounted for through control variables. The 
models specified in this section are estimated in chapter 5. 
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First, we discuss selection bias. The study is potentially affected by selection bias because of the 
selective nature of foreign investment. We can assume that the companies which are foreign-
owned are not randomly selected but rather foreign investment is disproportionately allocated to 
firms which had higher than average performance before the acquisition. Hence, if a foreign-
owned firm shows increased output this could either be linked to foreign ownership of the firm 
or it could show superior performance irrespective of foreign ownership. Not taking this factor 
into account would potentially lead to an overestimation of the correlation between foreign 
ownership and firm productivity. Applying corrections for this bias at the firm level also corrects 
it at the industry level as we are still measuring individual firm productivity. 
Another aspect of selection bias would result from the exit of firms in our model. If firms which 
are underperforming leave the market they would no longer be accounted for in our dataset after 
the year in which the exit. This is a potential source of attrition bias in the data. In theory, this 
result could go either way as the firm exiting the market could be domestically owned or foreign 
owned. However, we expect a selection bias towards better performing firms in the selection of 
firms with a foreign stake as described above. As a result, it is more likely that a firm exiting the 
market would be domestically owned. Hence, not accounting for this effect would potentially 
bias the estimation of foreign investment effect on firm productivity upwards. However, using 
our dataset we can assume that this second aspect of selection bias is to some extent accounted 
for by using unbalanced panel data for the complete Estonian manufacturing sector. We do not 
have to exclude firms from the analysis if they are not present throughout the complete time 
period observed, thereby accounting for entry and exit of firms.  
The Heckman two-stage procedure by Heckman (1979) is applied to counter the selection bias 
through non-random assignment of foreign ownership. This approach has been widely used in 
this field for studies which account for selection bias (e.g. Damijan et al 2003; Damijan et al 
2008; Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Haskel et al 2002). The Heckman procedure allows us to 
estimate the magnitude of potential selection bias contained in the data. This is achieved through 
estimating the likelihood of a firm being selected for foreign direct investment. In the first stage 
of the Heckman procedure we calculate the probability that the characteristics of a firm 
determine whether it is selected for foreign direct investment. The probit model used is similar in 
form to the ones used in Damijan et al (2003; 2008). We estimate the following probit model: 
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L,M	 = 1	O	P,				R = ΦMPTU	,VWX	Y		 	≠ PTU	,VWX	Y	R   (10) 
The variable  takes the value 1 if a firm has foreign ownership and 0 if it is domestically 
owned. The letter Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function. We assume that the error 
terms are independent and identically distributed. The error terms and Φ are also expected to be 
normally distributed. The variable  P is a vector of firm and industry-specific characteristics 
which are expected to influence the selection for foreign ownership. All variables of  P are 
measured identically to their previous specification with the equation number given in brackets. 
The firm-specific characteristics we include are firm size (see eq. 9), capital intensity (eq. 1) and 
total factor productivity (eq. 1) and the industry-specific characteristic foreign concentration (eq. 
5). All measurements are for the first year in our observation time period (t=1). 
The variables used of the probit estimation do not vary much between different studies and the 
variables we use follow these conventions. Firm size, capital intensity and different productivity 
measures are used widely (Sinani and Meyer, 2004; Vahter, 2004; Damijan et al 2003; Damijan 
et al 2008). Industry size and foreign concentration are employed by Damijan et al (2003; 2008). 
Other variables used are industry affiliation (Sinani and Meyer, 2004) and export propensity 
(Vahter, 2004; Damijan and Knell 2005). Including these variables is unlikely to increase the 
precision of our estimation of the non-hazard rate. Including a sector code for industry affiliation 
will likely only have an effect on foreign ownership through other industry-specific 
characteristics such as foreign concentration which is included in our variables. The inclusion of 
export propensity is more relevant in studies which study the effect of foreign ownership on firm 
exports.  
The results of the probit model described above can be referred to as the mills ratio or the non-
hazard rate of a firm. The non-hazard rate is calculated for each firm and is a measure of the 
probability that a firm has foreign ownership. As the results are based on a probit model, the 
values for the non-hazard rate range from 0 to 1. A higher value indicates a higher probability 
that a firm has foreign ownership. The non-hazard rate can now be used as an additional variable 
in the random effects estimation. This effectively counters the self-selection bias of foreign 
ownership arising from the fact that foreign ownership is not randomly assigned to firms in our 
dataset. 
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The following second economic consideration is the simultaneity problem of inputs. This is a 
common problem in productivity estimation. The productivity of a firm is determined by the 
inputs of production. In our model, these are measures of labour, capital and material inputs. The 
simultaneity problem arises because a firm determines its output at least to some extent 
simultaneously with its input use.  This simultaneity causes an endogeneity problem, meaning 
that firm output (the dependent variable) is correlated with the error term in case of economic 
shocks. In the case of a positive economic shock, a profit-maximizing firm will increase both its 
output and its input demand simultaneously as a reaction. The reverse is true for negative 
economic shocks.  
As the level of input use is endogenously determined by the firm it can only be observed within 
the firm and not by the data available to economists. This problem was first formalized by 
Marschak and Andrews (1944). As a result, ordinary least squares and random effects 
estimations would be biased upwards (Yasar et al, 2008).  Arnold (2005) suggests estimating a 
fixed effects model. This however requires making the assumption that the unobserved firm-
specific estimation errors due to endogeneity, as well as, the growth rate of total factor 
productivity are constant throughout the time period studied. However, from the theory expect 
total factor productivity to change in reaction to FDI presence and cannot assume that 
unobserved firm-specific errors due to endogeneity are constant. In consequence, results of fixed 
effects estimation as suggested by Arnold (2005) are likely to be biased. 
Two different methods are used to counter the simultaneity bias. Several studies (e.g. Javorcik, 
2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005) employ the technique developed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996). Olley and Pakes use investment to control for unobserved firm-specific differences in 
productivity. We employ the Levinsohn Petrin method which is based on the standard Olley and 
Pakes approach but extends it. In contrast to Olley and Pakes, it is used in more recent studies 
(e.g. Girma et al, 2008) and uses intermediate inputs to control for unobserved firm-specific 
differences. 
The Levinsohn Petrin has two main advantages compared to Olley Pakes. First, using data on 
intermediate inputs allows us to retain many observations in our dataset which would have been 
discarded because of missing data on investment. Second, we can assume that the use of 
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intermediate inputs is more directly connected to economic shocks than investment decisions are. 
When an economic shock occurs, the cost of adjustment for intermediate input use is likely to be 
lower than the cost of adjusting investments and is hence done faster. As a result, the Levinsohn 
Petrin method provides a less “lumpy” measure of the impact of economic shocks. 
The Levinsohn Petrin estimator overcomes the simultaneity bias by separating the error term into 
two different components which are denoted [ and \. Latter term is the randomly distributed 
error and therefore not correlated with firm output. The term [ however is correlated with firm 
output as it is the part of the error term which is due to decisions made by the firm to adjust its 
intermediate input use to econometric shocks. The Levinsohn Petrin makes it possible to define 
[ as a function of capital inputs  ] and material inputs $: 
[ =	[7] , $8       (11) 
The main assumption underlying this modeling is that ωt is monotonically increasing.  A 
decrease in the price of intermediates is expected to proportionally increase their use while the 
reverse is true for an increase in prices. This is an assumption that we can reasonably make. The 
Levinsohn Petrin method is discussed in more detail in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
Other approaches applied to counter the simultaneity bias are the generalized method of 
moments (GMM; e.g. Bwalya 2006) and instrumental variables (e.g. Vahter, 2010). However, 
these alternative approaches are also not free of limiting assumptions about the data. Rather, each 
of them imposes partially very specific requirements on data and limitations in interpretability 
(see Ackerberg et al, 2006). As our dataset contains information on intermediate inputs and 
hence allows use of the Levinsohn Petrin method, this is our preferred option. 
This leads to our third econometric consideration, the choice of estimation method. The main 
distinction is whether fixed effects or random effects estimation should be used. Generally, 
random effects would be preferable as it renders a more efficient estimation and the loss of 
degrees of freedom of fixed effects is avoided. However, random effects estimation is only 
appropriate if we can assume that the error terms are random across the units of observations (in 
our case the single firms in our dataset). In using random effects, we assume that all systematic 
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disturbances are included in the independent variables and the remaining error term is fully 
random. 
This is a strong assumption to make. Certainly, there are situations in which it this assumption is 
valid. The classic case is a small random sample of individuals drawn from a large population 
and precautions taken to make it representative (Baltagi, 2005). However in our case of using 
firm data for all sectors of the Estonian manufacturing industry there is some reason to doubt this 
assumption. The firms show great discrepancies in their characteristics ranging from size to use 
of inputs. This is a result of the diversity in different firms due to the broad range of firms from 
different sectors included in the study. Firm output may hence also be influenced by firm-
specific factors which are not observed in our model. This is an indication that a fixed effects 
model would be preferable in order to control for these firm-specific effects. The required 
assumption is that unobserved firm-specific effects are constant over the complete time period. 
As we study only a relatively short time period from 1998 to 2004, this is a reasonable 
assumption to make.  
Despite the significant advantage of controlling for firm-specific characteristics, there however is 
one important caveat to the sole use of fixed effects estimation. This is the extent to which fixed 
and random effects estimations make use of the data in our dataset. While random effects 
accounts for changes in variable parameters both within and between units, fixed effects 
estimation only assesses variations within each specific unit in our dataset. 
Applied to our dataset, this means that fixed effects estimation only makes use of variable 
parameters which change for an individual firm during the time period. If a variable parameter is 
constant, this information is not used for the fixed effects estimation results. In the context of this 
study, the implications are most important for the variable   which measures foreign 
ownership. The fixed effects estimation results only include those firms for which ownership 
changes at least once during the study period. While the results are valid, much of the data 
remains unused. Hence, there are significant reasons why both random effects and fixed effects 
estimations should be included in the study. The possible threat of unobserved firm-specific 
characteristics affecting the random effects estimation can be reduced by the inclusion of control 
variables for year and industry sector in the estimation (see for instance Vahter, 2004). 
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4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in our study is discussed in the order of the general structure of the study. First, we 
discuss the firm-level data used for the empirical application on the direct and indirect effects of 
FDI. Then, we go on to discuss the sector-level data which is used in the second part of the 
empirical application, the pecuniary effects of FDI. The link between the two parts of the 
empirical application is created by the discussion of the linkage variables. These are measured at 
the sectoral level and used in both the firm-level and sectoral-level models. 
The firm-level data used in this study is based on the company balance sheets in the Estonian 
business register. The study period is the time period from 1998 to 2004. The initial dataset 
contains data for all firms in the Estonian manufacturing industry. As this data naturally reflects 
the entry and exit of firms, it is an unbalanced panel dataset. The dataset contains information on 
total sales, intermediate inputs use, fixed assets, foreign ownership, number of employees, and 
NACE two-digit industry classification for each firm and each year. Each value can be linked to 
the specific firm.  
The manufacturing industry is defined according to the NACE classification of firms in its 
revision 1.1. All firms from sector 15 to 37 are included in the dataset (see table 3). NACE is the 
statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community. The NACE 
classification is directly comparable to the United Nations International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) and national classifications within the European 
Union, such as the Estonian EMTAK classification. 
The total number of firms in the Estonian manufacturing industry for the time period studies is 
10,357 firms, representing 33,961 unique observations. In three NACE sectors there are only 
domestic firms operating, hence these sectors are excluded from the study. In sector 23 this 
concerns 13 observations, in sector 27 these are 45 observations, and in sector 30 these are 60 
observations. Hence, a total of 118 observations is removed. Sector 16 (tobacco products) is not 
included in the study as there are no firms at all active in this sector in Estonia during the period 
studied. 
From the remaining dataset of 33,843 observations, we need to remove those observations for 
which productivity cannot be observed as the relevant data values are missing. We require data 
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for output, fixed assets, number of employees and material inputs in order to assess total factor 
productivity (TFP) using the Levinsohn Petrin method. Further use of the term productivity in 
this chapter refers to TFP calculated according to the Levinsohn Petrin method. There are 15,734 
observations for which productivity cannot be calculated because required data is missing in the 
dataset. These observations are dropped, thereby creating a panel dataset of 18,109 observations 
for the years 1998-2004. 
There are clearly extreme outliers in the data as figure 4 shows. The mean productivity is 199.61, 
while some of the observations record a productivity higher than 10,000. Clearly, these 
observations represent special cases of firms or errors in the data. In the case of sector 32, it is 
likely that the outliers represent Elcoteq, an electronics manufacturer for which the dataset 
records very high output but near-zero material inputs. We remove the outliers from the dataset 
by removing the lowest and highest one per cent of observations based on the productivity 
measured. 724 observations are removed from the dataset, thereby creating the final dataset of 
17,385 observations shown in figure 5. The total number of observations of unique firms is 
5,178. As this is an unbalanced panel, the exact number of firms varies between 1,624 and 3,087 
(see table 1). 
Figure 4: Firm productivity by industry sector before removal of outliers 
 
Source: own calculations based on dataset 
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Figure 5: Firm productivity by industry sector after removal of outliers 
 
Source: own calculations based on dataset 
Table 1: Number of firms in the dataset 
Year Number of firms 
1998 1624 
1999 1884 
2000 2455 
2001 2576 
2002 2818 
2003 2941 
2004 3087 
 
The number of dropped observations is typical for studies in this field due to the comparatively 
high data requirements. The number of dropped observations equals 48.7 per cent of total 
observations, which is comparable for instance to Aitken and Harrison (1999) with 37.8 per cent 
dropped observations. Table 2 gives the summary statistics for the variables used in the study 
while an overview of the firm data is given in table 3. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of firm-level variables and linkage variables 
 Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
ln Y 17385 14.732 1.754 
ln K 17385 12.760 2.156 
ln L 17385 2.778 1.331 
ln M 17385 13.976 2.000 
HORIZ 17385 0.267    0.177          
BACKW 17385 0.269       0.121          
FORWD 17385 0.503    0.267          
 
Table 3: Number of firms, ownership and foreign concentration per industry sector 
Manufacturing sector NACE 1.1 
sector code 
Ownership and 
Number of Firms* 
Foreign 
concentration** 
  Domestic 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Firms 
Total 
Share of 
employees 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 15 537 46 562 0.17 
Textiles 17 185 42 221 0.67 
Wearing apparel; dressing and 
dyeing of fur 18 367 50 404 0.20 
Tanning and dressing of leather; 
manufacture of luggage, handbags, 
saddlery, harness and footwear 19 48 17 60 0.21 
Wood and of products of wood and 
cork, except furniture; articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 20 1049 74 1104 0.11 
Pulp, paper and paper products 21 48 12 59 0.76 
Publishing, printing and reproduction 
of recorded media 22 434 38 462 0.13 
Chemicals and chemical products 24 96 17 110 0.46 
Rubber and plastic products 25 153 40 187 0.26 
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 161 34 187 0.50 
Fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 28 692 78 755 0.29 
Machinery and equipment  29 235 58 284 0.25 
Electrical machinery and apparatus  31 89 25 111 0.44 
Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 32 72 28 96 0.76 
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 33 143 21 163 0.35 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 34 32 8 36 0.04 
Other transport equipment 35 88 11 98 0.28 
Furniture; manufacturing  36 507 73 560 0.34 
Recycling 37 35 1 36 0.13 
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Manufacturing industry total all sectors 4971 673 5495 0.26 
* Number of firms given as total numbers of unique firms for 1998-2004. 317 firms included in domestic 
and foreign columns because of ownership change in study period. 
**Foreign concentration measured as share of employees in foreign firms as share of total sector 
employment, average for 1998-2004 
Source: own calculations based on Estonian business register 
 
The data shows that the number of firms varies significantly between industry sectors. The 
highest number of firms is recorded in sector 20 (wood and wood products) with 1,104 firms in 
the dataset. The lowest number of firms is in sector 37 (recycling). Of the overall number of 
5,495 firms in table 3, 673 have majority foreign ownership. This equals 12.25 per cent of the 
total number of firms. Foreign concentration measured as the share of employment in foreign-
owned companies is 32 per cent of total manufacturing industry employment.  
 
The data shows that there are great differences in foreign concentration across different industries. In 
figure 6 we see that the highest foreign concentration is found in the radio and television equipment (76 
per cent, sector 32) with an equal value in the paper products sector (76 per cent, sector 21). Both sectors 
have relatively few enterprises with 59 firms in paper products and 96 firms in radio and television 
equipment. The textile sector has high foreign concentration averaging 76 per cent. The by far lowest 
foreign concentration is recorded for sector 34 (motor vehicles) with 4 per cent. Four other sectors can be 
classified as having a low share of employment in foreign firms below 20 per cent. These are food 
products (sector 15), wood and wood products (sector 20), publishing (sector 22) and recycling (sector 
37). All remaining sectors have medium concentrations of foreign direct investment ranging from 20 per 
cent to 50 per cent of employment share. 
0
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Figure 6: Foreign concentration across industry sectors
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Next, we assess the detailed firm level data comparing foreign and domestic firms per sector and over the 
whole industry. A detailed overview of average productivity, employment and output of foreign and 
domestic firms is given in table 4. For the whole manufacturing sector, foreign firms on average have 
higher total factor productivity (TFP), a higher number of employees and higher output. However, the 
difference is less significant in TFP than in output and number of employees. The domestic firm average 
TFP is 81 per cent of that of foreign firms while this value is 19 per cent for output. In contrast, domestic 
firms are on average only 29 per cent of the size of foreign firms. This means that in the overall 
manufacturing industry, foreign firms have higher productivity but are disproportionately greater in terms 
of employment size and output produced. 
Table 4: Firm-level characteristics of domestic and foreign firms across sectors* 
Sector Total factor productivity** Number of employees Output*** 
 Domestic 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Ratio****  Domestic 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Ratio****   Domestic 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Ratio****   
15 85.72 114.27 0.75 30.18 78.69 0.38 14.6 123.0 0.12 
17 96.24 110.8 0.87 27.55 242.55 0.11 10.3 89.7 0.11 
18 118.81 147.14 0.81 34.88 52.72 0.66 6.4 10.2 0.62 
19 96.94 98.52 0.98 42.59 29.56 1.44 6.4 7.5 0.86 
20 86.48 102.79 0.84 17.24 29.46 0.59 8.4 19.7 0.43 
21 97.37 123.14 0.79 14.01 134.79 0.10 5.7 111.0 0.05 
22 113.58 132.4 0.86 13.55 25.00 0.54 5.5 12.6 0.43 
24 109.20 148.07 0.74 24.96 102.44 0.24 19.0 121.0 0.16 
25 111.53 118.1 0.94 22.63 26.18 0.86 14.2 29.5 0.48 
26 98.74 124.35 0.79 16.28 77.08 0.21 7.1 76.5 0.09 
28 101.42 125.92 0.81 17.06 65.49 0.26 6.9 43.2 0.16 
29 101.73 120.04 0.85 22.44 27.95 0.80 7.3 20.0 0.37 
31 106.47 120.96 0.88 22.24 112.73 0.20 9.7 53.2 0.18 
32 109.19 147.32 0.74 14.76 171.16 0.09 4.9 56.1 0.09 
33 116.99 125.26 0.93 14.30 44.23 0.32 5.0 52.2 0.10 
34 96.48 114.15 0.85 44.86 17.27 2.60 20.7 12.9 1.60 
35 106.04 138.96 0.76 17.56 119.52 0.15 5.9 65.9 0.09 
36 89.98 104.62 0.86 21.32 72.94 0.29 7.2 39.8 0.18 
37 115.18 175.81 0.66 11.27 24.17 0.47 14.2 21.6 0.66 
Industry 98.78 121.91 0.81 21.51 73.60 0.29 8.6 46.4 0.19 
* All data as averages for 1998-2004 
**Calculated according to Levinsohn Petrin method using logarithms of employment, output, fixed assets and 
material inputs based on deflated financial data 
***Output in million Estonian kroon (EEK), deflated 
****Ratio: Domestic firm parameter value / Foreign firm parameter value (foreign firm mean is 1.00) 
Source: own calculations based on Estonian business register 
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We are primarily interested in productivity differences between domestic and foreign firms. 
Figure 7 displays a comparison of the TFP of both domestic and foreign firms. Average 
productivity of foreign firms is higher in all industry sectors but there are differences in the size 
of the productivity gap to average value for domestic firms. In three sectors, average domestic 
firm productivity is more than 90 per cent of average foreign firm productivity. These are the 
sectors of leather manufacture (sector 19), rubber products (sector 25) and medical and optical 
instruments (sector 33). The productivity gap is particularly large in sector 37 (recycling), where 
domestic firms show only 66 per cent of foreign firm productivity on average. 
 
Next, we discuss the data related to the measurement of indirect effects of FDI. To measure the 
indirect effects of FDI we employ linkage variables for horizontal linkages, backward linkages 
and forward linkages. Horizontal linkages are measured with the variable HORIZ, backward 
linkages with the variable BACKW and forward linkages with the variable FORWD. All 
linkages variables are measured for each sector and each year according to the methodology 
described in chapter 3. 
We first give the statistical summary of the linkage variables for each year at the industry level in 
table 4. Then, table 5 presents averages of the linkage variables for each sector over the time 
period studied. All linkage variables have been calculated based on the Estonian business register 
data in our dataset. Supply and use relationships between different sectors were established using 
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Figure 7: Productivity domestic and foreign-owned firms across 
industry sectors compared
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the year 2000 input-output table at the NACE two-digit level obtained from the Estonian 
statistical office. This table is used throughout the study as input-output tables are not available 
for more specific time intervals. Through the inclusion of the measure of foreign concentration 
for each year and sector, it is however possible to represent supply and use relationships between 
sectors taking foreign firm concentration into account. 
Table 5: Summary statistics for spillover variables 
  HORIZ BACKW FORWD 
Year Number of 
sectors 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
1998 19 0.235 0.146 0.274 0.117 0.381 0.172 
1999 19 0.267 0.189 0.300 0.137 0.517 0.237 
2000 19 0.236 0.161 0.238 0.097 0.527 0.292 
2001 19 0.298 0.211 0.222 0.089 0.527 0.302 
2002 19 0.278 0.183 0.291 0.133 0.534 0.294 
2003 19 0.269 0.173 0.294 0.124 0.489 0.222 
2004 19 0.276 0.163  
The summary statistics of the linkage variables show several patterns. All three linkage variables 
however show strong fluctuations in their values over time. No variable clearly exhibits a 
specific development over time. Trends in the variables can however be distinguished. The 
horizontal variable overall increases its mean value over time, albeit this trend is not constant. 
This is an indication that foreign concentration in the manufacturing industry sectors has on 
average increased. The values of the backward linkage variable are relatively lower in the middle 
years of the study period. This is an indication that firms have decreased their use of intermediate 
inputs produced by foreign firms in these years. The mean values of the forward linkage 
variables are relatively constant over time with the exception of the first year of the study period. 
As backward and forward linkage variables are used only as lagged variables by one year, values 
for the last study period are not required for these variables. 
Table 6: Coefficients for linkage variables per industry sector (overall mean 1998-2004) 
Sector Linkage coefficients 
 Horizontal (HORIZ) Backward (BACKW) Forward (FORWD) 
15 0.1707 0.2547 0.9900 
17 0.6573 0.3907 0.3141 
18 0.2046 0.4177 0.5525 
19 0.2002 0.2979 0.1107 
20 0.1075 0.1695 0.7008 
21 0.7437 0.3436 0.0310 
22 0.1306 0.1495 0.3771 
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24 0.4700 0.3561 0.1951 
25 0.2585 0.3823 0.2672 
26 0.5005 0.4437 0.2628 
28 0.3007 0.3026 0.3693 
29 0.2397 0.3472 0.2811 
31 0.4397 0.5690 0.3187 
32 0.7626 0.0000 0.0000 
33 0.3364 0.1816 0.3489 
34 0.0408 0.4318 0.0498 
35 0.2735 0.3401 0.3998 
36 0.3366 0.2199 0.4888 
37 0.1387 0.1028 0.0049 
Industry 0.2672 0.3000 0.3191 
Source: own calculations based on Estonian business register and Statistics Estonia 
year 2000 input-output table 
 
The forward and backward linkage coefficients are displayed in figure 8. Horizontal linkages are 
not discussed as their calculation is identical to the measures of foreign concentration discussed 
earlier. The sectors vary considerably in their extent of both forward and backward linkages. The 
variation between sectors is somewhat larger for forward linkages as seen in the higher standard 
deviation of the forward linkage coefficient (see table 5). The highest value for the backward 
linkage coefficient is found in sector 31 (electrical machinery). This indicates that this sector 
sources a comparatively high share of its intermediate inputs from sectors in which foreign 
concentration is high. The by far largest value for forward linkages is found in sector 15. This 
value has been checked for possible miscalculations in the data. The high forward linkage value 
is however simply the cumulative result of the comparatively high share of sector output sold to 
sectors with high foreign concentration.  
It should also be noted that both forward and backward linkage coefficients are nil for sector 32 
(communications equipment) and the forward linkage coefficient is nil for sector 37 (recycling). 
For both sectors, this would imply that none of the sector output is sold to sectors with foreign 
concentration while for sector 32 additionally none of the intermediate inputs are bought from 
sectors with a foreign share. These sectors demonstrate a limitation of studying the forward and 
backward linkages in the manufacturing industry only while assuming no trade. For sectors 32 
and 37, it is likely that supply and use relations are primarily with sectors outside manufacturing 
(such as services) or conducted on the international level. For the study as a whole this does 
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however not pose a threat. Possible distortions would only affect the measurement of indirect 
effects of FDI while the remaining parts of the study concerning direct effects and pecuniary 
externalities are not affected. Also, the effect on the assessment of indirect effects is likely to be 
very small as both sectors are among the smallest in the manufacturing industry. 
 
Next, we discuss the sectoral-level data collected for the second part of the empirical 
application. We use this sectoral-level data for the model of domestic firm entry in each 
manufacturing sector. As in the first part of the empirical application, our data is for the 
Estonian manufacturing industry. Due to data requirements, the study period is modified to the 
period 1999-2004. We conduct a sector-level analysis of the 19 manufacturing sectors as our 
units of observation. The definition and selection of sectors remains unchanged from their 
previous use. The data source also remains the same as the sectoral-level data is also based on 
Estonian business register. Table 7 presents the statistical summary of the units used in the 
sectoral-level study. There is a total of 114 observations for all variables based on 19 industry 
sectors with measurements taken for each of the six years.  
Table 7: Summary Statistics of sectoral-level variables 
 Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
E 114 0.065 0.099 
0
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Figure 8: Backward and forward linkage coefficients 
per sector
BACKW FORWD
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GR 114 0.129 0.308 
ln SIZE 114 7.755 1.087 
ln MES 114 12.472 3.257 
CONC 114 0.166 0.060 
HORIZ 114 0.332   0.235          
 
Table 8 gives an overview of the domestic firm entry rates for each sector and each year. There 
are strong fluctuations between entry rates in the different years which can be explained by the 
detail of the study level and hence the small sector size. Overall, entry rates are comparatively 
higher in the first half of the period studied between 1998 and 2000 and decrease in the second 
half. In the second half, the net effect on the number of domestic firms is negative for many 
sectors particularly in 2002. Domestic firm entry rates vary considerably between sectors.  The 
highest average entry rates are observed in sectors 37 (recycling), 25 (plastic products), 28 (metal 
products) and 34 (motor vehicles). In sectors 32 (communication equipment), 15 (food products) 
and 19 (leather manufacture) the average growth rate over the study period is close to zero. 
Table 8: Domestic firm entry rates across manufacturing industry sectors 
Sector Year  
 1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 2003   Sector 
Average 
15 0.11 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 
17 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 
18 0.06 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 
19 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
20 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 
21 -0.02 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.21 -0.04 0.06 
22 0.13 0.09 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.05 
24 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 
25 0.17 0.06 0.21 0.10 -0.01 0.10 0.11 
26 0.01 0.19 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.05 
28 0.26 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.11 
29 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.07 
31 0.22 -0.01 0.13 0.15 -0.06 0.02 0.08 
32 -0.08 -0.20 0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 
33 0.06 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
34 0.29 0.07 0.23 -0.03 -0.08 0.18 0.11 
35 0.07 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.10 
36 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.08 
37 0.67 0.24 0.23 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.17 
Year 
Average 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.05 
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Source: own calculations based on Estonian business register 
 
5. Estimation Results 
The presentation of the estimation results is divided into two parts. In chapter 5.1. we estimate 
the models related to direct and indirect effects of FDI including the estimation of the Heckman 
selection model. In chapter 5.2. we then estimate the results for our model on domestic firm 
entry in order to assess the evidence for pecuniary externalities of FDI. 
5.1. Estimation results for productivity effects 
We first estimate the probit model for the Heckman two-stage procedure in order to control for 
selection bias in foreign ownership. The possible threat of selection bias arises from the non-
random assignment of foreign ownership to firms. It may be the case that foreign ownership is 
disproportionately allocated to better-performing firms. The discussion of selection bias and the 
Heckman procedure along with the specifications of the probit model to be estimated are 
discussed in detail in chapter 3. The results attained from the probit model allow us to calculate 
the non-hazard rate (inverse Mills ratio) for each firm which can then be included in the 
productivity estimations. 
Table 9: Estimation of the Heckman probit model 
Dependent variable: Foreign ownership 
Variable Random effects model 
 Coefficent Std. Error p-value 
ln L .1559227     .014088 0.000 
ln K .1147329    .0088954 0.000 
TFP (LP) .0053565    .0002749 0.000 
HORIZ .944881 .070233 0.000 
constant -3.929439    .1036268 0.000 
    
Source: own calculations based on panel dataset 
 
The parameters used to estimate the probit model are the log of firm size, the log of fixed assets, 
and total factor productivity of each firm. Additionally, foreign concentration is added as a 
industry-specific characteristic. The estimation is shown in table 9. The estimated parameters for 
each firm are then used to create the inverse Mills ratio, or the non-hazard rate for each firm. The 
use of these combined values as an additional variable in the direct and indirect effects 
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regression however does not produce reliable results. The effect of the calculated inverse Mills 
ratio on the estimation is on a scale which does not allow conclusions about the other variables 
studied. We interpret this as an indicator that significant selection bias in present in the data. 
Hence, we do not include the inverse Mills ratio in our estimations in the following sub-chapters. 
This implies that the random effects estimations in these models need to be treated carefully as 
they are likely to be influenced by selection bias to some extent. This does not mean that they 
cannot be used for analysis, however this caveat needs to be taken into account when interpreting 
random effects estimation results.   
5.1.1. Direct effects of FDI 
To assess the evidence for direct effects of FDI we run fixed- and random effects for all 
manufacturing sectors in the first step. We estimate total factor productivity calculated according 
to the Levinsohn Petrin method as discussed in chapter 3.4 .  There are a few differences 
between the random and fixed effects estimations due to the economic consideration discussed in 
chapter 3.7 . The random effects estimation includes dummy variables for both sector and year-
specific effects. In the fixed effects estimation, these dummy variables are not included as the 
fixed effects estimation only compares one unit of observation (one firm) to the same firm. 
Hence, sector- and year-specific terms do not need to be explicitly controlled for. Table 9 
presents the results of our estimation for all manufacturing sectors. 
Table 10: Regression results for direct effects of FDI, manufacturing industry level 
Study period: 1998-2004 Dependent variable: total factor productivity (Levinsohn Petrin estimation) 
Variable Random effects model Fixed effects model 
 Coefficent Std. Error* p-value Coefficent Std. Error* p-value 
ln K 5.633 0.405 0.000 6.165 0.598 0.000 
ln L -2.981 0.856 0.000 -6.887 1.315 0.000 
ln M -6.006 0.669 0.000 -8.036 0.981 0.000 
FDI 17.944 1.819 0.000 5.502 2.692 0.041 
constant -3331.871 325.054 0.000 150.257 12.042 0.000 
Sector dummy  included      
Year dummy included      
   
Hausman test Prob>chi2 =      0.0000  
*robust standard errors 
Source: own calculations based on panel dataset 
 
58 
 
Table 9 presents both the random and fixed effects regression results. In our discussion of fixed 
and random effects estimation we state that fixed effects estimation is likely to be preferable 
when there is a large enough number of observations. In this case, the disadvantage of fixed 
effects estimation of using less of the information contained in the data does not play such an 
important role. As we are analyzing the complete dataset for the manufacturing sector in this 
estimation, the number of observations is clearly large enough for fixed effects to be preferable. 
This reasoning is further corroborated by a Hausman test resulting in a p-value of 0.0000. This 
indicates that the null hypothesis that random effects regression is more suitable can be rejected 
and fixed effects estimation should be used. 
For the estimation of direct effects in the complete manufacturing industry, fixed and random 
effects results do however not differ to a large extent. Both show that foreign ownership 
correlates with higher total factor productivity in companies. There is some difference in 
significance however, as the FDI dummy variable is only significant at the five percent level in 
the fixed effects estimation while it is significant at the one per cent level in the random effects 
model. This may however be related at least to some extent to selection bias and the fixed effects 
model is preferred. Hence, as a result of the estimation of direct effects of FDI we see that a 
correlation between foreign ownership and total factor productivity of firms in the manufacturing 
industry can be observed. This finding is in line with previous research both in the CEE and 
worldwide in studies of the correlation between FDI and productivity. 
Next, we continue with the estimations for individual sectors. Due to the small number of 
observations in some of the sectors, fixed effects estimation would likely be biased. Due to small 
sector size, for a significant share of sectors reliable fixed effects estimations could not be 
calculated. Hence, a random effects model is used for the individual sector estimations. A 
summary of the estimation results for the FDI variable  is found in table 11. 
Table 11: Regression results for direct effects of FDI, sector level 
Study period: 1998-2004 
Dependent variable: total factor productivity (Levinsohn Petrin estimation) 
Sector Variable Random effects model 
  Coefficent Std. Error* p-value 
15 FDI 10.35776 4.86852 0.033** 
17 FDI 15.22494 7.624346 0.046** 
18 FDI 23.33496 6.228721 0.000*** 
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19 FDI 14.96608 8.391493 0.075* 
20 FDI 9.371294 3.643389 0.010*** 
21 FDI 19.46034 8.584582 0.023** 
22 FDI 13.42573 5.8511 0.022** 
24 FDI 26.19725 7.635277 0.001*** 
25 FDI 10.38529 6.377401 0.103 
26 FDI 17.60595 5.353733 0.001*** 
28 FDI 24.864 5.488746 0.000*** 
29 FDI 11.94521 4.474511 0.008*** 
31 FDI 8.199618 13.02732 0.529 
32 FDI 13.84133 12.42766 0.265 
33 FDI 20.80508 15.88509 0.190 
34 FDI 9.132556 6.336951 0.150 
35 FDI 42.68577 15.79011 0.007*** 
36 FDI 11.84778 3.202615 0.000*** 
37 FDI 31.99649 17.44806 0.067* 
 ***/**/* significant at 1/5/10 per cent level 
*robust standard errors 
Source: own calculations based on panel dataset 
 
The possibility that the results of the random effects estimation contain some degree of selection bias 
needs to be kept in mind for their interpretation. The extent of effect may be overestimated to a 
differing degree in different sectors. However, despite this fact the sector results still yield 
information about the sectors in which direct effects of FDI are more likely to play a greater role. 
This is particularly the case as the sectors in which a significant correlation between foreign 
ownership and total factor productivity of firms is found are mostly significant at the one per 
cent level.  In a total of eight sectors this is the case. 
While these eight sectors are quite diverse, two specific clusters can be identified. The first one is 
a knowledge and technology intensive cluster around machinery, metal products, mineral 
products and chemicals. These are sectors 24 and 26 to 29. The second cluster is interestingly 
related to wood processing, namely the wood sector itself (sector 20) and the furniture sector 
(sector 36). Both are sectors with a relatively high number of firms in which foreign owned tend 
to firm significantly larger than domestic firms as the descriptive data in chapter 4 shows. This 
fits our observation on productivity. It is likely that the larger foreign firms have greater 
economies of scale and that they are able to implement innovative changes more effectively than 
their small domestic counterparts. This may cause the high correlation between FDI and 
productivity in these sectors. 
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As a result, we can state that there is a correlation between foreign ownership and productivity at 
the firm level in the manufacturing industry. This is an indication that direct effects (own firm) 
indeed may cause higher productivity in foreign-owned firms. However, this evidence for these 
effects is clearly not evenly strong across different sectors. Rather, some sectors seem to profit 
more from a possible direct effect than others.  
5.1.2. Indirect effects of FDI 
Next, we estimate the regressions relating to the indirect effects of FDI on productivity. Hence, 
we include the linkage variables for horizontal, backward and forward linkages in our model as 
discussed in chapter 3.5.. All linkage variables are used in lagged form by one period. This 
regression is also estimated first for the complete manufacturing industry and then for individual 
sectors. Table 12 shows the estimation results for the complete manufacturing industry and table 
13 shows estimation results for the individual sectors. 
Table 12: Regression results for indirect effects of FDI, manufacturing industry level 
Study period: 1999-2004 
Dependent variable: total factor productivity (Levinsohn Petrin estimation) 
Variable Random effects model Fixed effects model 
 Coefficent Std. Error* p-value Coefficent Std. Error* p-value 
ln K 6.135 0.449 0.000 5.190 0.710 0.000 
ln L -2.592 0.939 0.006 -6.920 1.547 0.000 
ln M -5.927 0.741 0.000 -9.738 1.182 0.000 
HORIZ 1.069 3.571 0.765 8.638 4.864 0.076 
BACKW 21.044 4.745 0.000 -11.927 6.366 0.061 
FORWD -18.700 2.076 0.000 14.967 2.975 0.000 
constant -4051.129 491.606 0.000 180.024 15.199 0.000 
Sector 
dummy  included    
  
Year 
dummy included    
  
     
Hausman 
test 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
*robust standard errors 
Source: own calculations based on panel dataset 
 
In the estimation of indirect effects of FDI, the results of the fixed effects and random effects 
estimation differ significantly from each other. Based on the dataset used and the result of a 
61 
 
Hausman test, the fixed effects model is preferable. The fixed effects estimation shows that 
horizontal, backward and forward linkage variables all have a statistically significant correlation 
with firm total factor productivity. This effects is most significant for the forward linkage 
variable. It is in an indication that firms which sell a greater share of their output to sectors with 
higher foreign concentration are expected to have higher total factor productivity. The next 
finding is that backward linkages are statistically significant but negative. This is an indication 
that receiving a higher share of output from foreign firms is correlated with lower total factor 
productivity in the receiving firm. The third finding concerning indirect effects is that horizontal 
linkages are correlated with higher firm productivity. Next, we discuss the sector-level 
correlation of FDI on total factor productivity. 
Table 13: Regression results for indirect effects of FDI, sector level  
Study period: 1999-2004 
Dependent variable: total factor productivity (Levinsohn Petrin estimation) 
Overview of statistically significant results (see appendix for full data) 
Random Effects model 
Sector Variable Coefficent Std. Err* p-value Sector Variable Coefficient Std. Err.* p-value 
15 HORIZ 108.6483   47.79129     0.023** 28 HORIZ 256.0794   154.2808     0.097* 
17 BACKW -285.4084   64.75017    0.000***  BACKW -455.923    220.637    0.039** 
 FORWD 369.2086   85.36808     0.000***  FORWD 328.5662   116.1722     0.005*** 
18 HORIZ -171.49   74.09196    0.021** 29 BACKW -36.8536   53.05566    0.046** 
20 HORIZ -253.182  104.4676    0.015**  FORWD 87.61555   43.90553     0.000*** 
 BACKW 228.3616   85.06541     0.007*** 32 HORIZ 1.522343    21.75657     0.07** 
 FORWD 10.01837   4.920647     0.042** 33 HORIZ -107.103  59.24474    0.071* 
24 HORIZ 321.0668   145.6645     0.028**  BACKW -215.571  62.72629    0.001*** 
 BACKW -536.9405   254.4795    0.035**  FORWD -124.781   49.51427    0.012** 
25 HORIZ 261.517   129.0344     0.043** 36 HORIZ -88.5301   44.74494    0.048** 
      BACKW -125.032   45.58966    0.006*** 
      FORWD 101.829   37.64726     0.007*** 
          
* robust standard errors 
Source: own calculations based on panel dataset 
***/**/* significant at 1/5/10 per cent level 
 
The indirect effects at the sectoral level show a very diverse picture of different effects between 
sectors. There are some conclusions that can be drawn based on the random effects results. First, 
inter-sectoral effects are only measured in about half of the sectors while they are not significant 
in the remaining ones. The results for the remaining sectors can be found in the appendix. 
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Second, when inter-sectoral linkages are found they tend to have comparatively strong 
significance. Third, evidence for one kind of indirect effects in a sector makes it more likely that 
other kinds are also found. This is particularly true with forward and backward linkages where 
one kind often is observed together with the other. 
5.2. Pecuniary externalities 
As the second part of the empirical application we evaluate the evidence for pecuniary 
externalities of FDI through assessing the correlation between foreign concentration in a sector 
and the domestic firm entry rate in the following year. If FDI has an influence through changes 
in the market structure and on entry conditions for domestic firms, we would expect to see a 
correlation between foreign concentration and entry rate. If the correlation is positive, this would 
be an indication that foreign investment may act as a driver of local industrial development. 
Table 14: Regression results for domestic firm entry rate 
Study period: 1999-2003 
Dependent variable: domestic firm entry rate per sector 
Variable Random effects model 
 Coefficent Std. Error p-value 
GR 0.0616 0.0245      0.012 
ln SIZE -0.0071    0.0075       0.344 
ln MES -0.0028    0.0035       0.415 
COMP 0.0940     0.2184      0.667 
HORIZ -0.0053    0.0343       0.876 
constant 0.0873 0.0830 0.293 
    
Hausman test   Prob>chi2 =      0.9362 
Source: own calculations based on panel dataset 
 
The estimation the random effects model does not corroborate the assumption that FDI may 
serve as a source of local industrial development through increasing the entry rate of domestic 
firms in a sector. The findings for the relationship are statistically insignificant. The basic firm 
entry model employed cannot show that FDI affects the entry rate. This does however not mean 
that pecuniary externalities of FDI do overall not exist but only applies to the definition 
employed in this model. Pecuniary externalities on firm entry may require a longer time to 
emerge and hence may need a longer time horizon to be observable. They may exert a more 
indirect effect for instance through the development of price levels for goods traded between 
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sectors which may affect market conditions for domestic firms. Hence, the model used in this 
study does not find a correlation but could be extended in order to track pecuniary externalities 
more specifically. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Foreign direct investment and its effect on host countries have been much discussed topics in 
both academia and the public policy sphere. They likely will remain on the agenda in the future 
to come as states continue to compete for capital and knowledge accompanied by increasingly 
less restrictions on the international transfer of both of them. Likely, potential investors in the 
future will also be offered incentives by host governments. 
The results of this study suggest that there may not be sufficient evidence for much special 
support being put in place to attract FDI. This study exploits a large and detailed panel data set of 
firms in the Estonian economy to assess the evidence of direct and indirect effects of FDI. The 
study is conducted through assessing the correlation of foreign ownership at the firm and sectoral 
level and firm productivity. Additionally, at the sectoral level the evidence for pecuniary 
externalities is evaluated through a model of domestic firm entry based on foreign investments in 
a sector. 
The inflow of foreign direct investment may affect the host country through a large variety of 
different mechanisms which have been discussed in the literature. Most effects are not 
unequivocally positive or negative but depend much on case-specific circumstances. This study 
has assessed three mechanisms through which FDI may affect the host country. These are the 
direct (own firm) effects, indirect spillover effects and pecuniary externalities of foreign 
investment. 
The results are mixed. This study adds to the existing literature through three results based on 
data for the Estonian economy. First, foreign ownership is found to have a positive correlation 
with productivity in firms in the host country. While the extent of this effect may vary between 
sectors, overall there is relatively strong evidence for direct effects of FDI on productivity. 
Second, the results are more mixed concerning indirect effects of FDI. The study finds horizontal 
and forward linkages to have a positive correlation with firm productivity while the correlation is 
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negative for backward linkages. The study makes it possible to compare effects in different 
sector for both direct and indirect effects, thereby providing directions for further research into 
sector-specific characteristics facilitating spillover effects. As a third finding, the study cannot 
corroborate the assumption that positive effects of FDI may to a significant extent occur through 
pecuniary externalities. The simply entry rate model employed in the study does not find a 
correlation between domestic firm entry and foreign concentration in a sector. 
 The results differ from much of the previous studies given the fact that most studies have found 
stronger evidence for a positive effect through backward linkages than for other kinds of 
spillovers. These mixed findings reflect the variety of mechanisms by which FDI affects a host 
country. The mixed findings point to the direction in which future research should continue.  
Most studies in the field focus on direct and indirect effects of FDI while the exact mechanisms 
through which spillovers occur still remain largely a “black box”. This study makes a 
contribution to other kinds of spillovers through assessing the effect of FDI on one aspect of 
pecuniary externalities. Further research needs to aim at disentangling more precisely the 
specific mechanisms at work through which effects on the host country may occur. Given the 
promising findings concerning indigenous firm development found for mainly Ireland and 
Poland in the literature, the mechanisms of pecuniary externalities should be a focus of attention. 
As with other studies in the same field, we need to be cautious with policy conclusions as we are 
measuring the correlation between two factors but not directly the possible causal link between 
them. Generally, there is evidence that inflow of FDI is correlated with increased productivity 
especially when ownership is transferred. This result provides some rationale for countries to 
actively encourage the inflow of foreign investments. However, policy also needs to incorporate 
the fact that the specific mechanisms of host country effect are still largely unclear. 
These two policy implications are already found in the Estonian policy regime towards FDI and 
their continuation can hence be recommended. Based on the findings of this study, the strength 
of the regime lies in its focus on creating an overall favourable investment. This is in contrast to 
very specifically targeting sectors or kinds of investments and providing subsidies for these as 
has been the case in other countries. The rationale of specific subsidies is not sufficiently 
corroborated by the empirical literature including this study and hence may only distort 
investment flows. Estonia has been successful in the attraction of FDI through its policy of non-
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discrimination between different sources of investments and hence its continuation can be 
recommended.  
There is no reason why lessons from the Estonian FDI policy experience may not also be 
applicable in particular to other transition economies. However, particularly three specific 
characteristics of the Estonian situation need to be taken into consideration when applying 
similar measures as these characteristics may affect outcomes. First, Estonia early introduced a 
clear and consistent FDI policy regime. The small size of the country may have played a role in 
the quick and consistent implementation. Second, Estonia at the time of its economic 
liberalization already had a relatively high standard of development when compared to other 
transition economies. This may have facilitated the development of positive host country effects. 
Third, the cultural and geographic proximity to the Nordic countries has served as a 
comparatively easily accessible source of investments. Such an advantage is arguably not 
available to many other transition economies. 
7. Appendix  
Appendix: Regression results for indirect effects of FDI, sector level 
Study period: 1999-2004 
Dependent variable: total factor productivity (Levinsohn Petrin 
estimation) 
Sector Variable Random effects model 
  Coefficent Std. Error* p-value 
15 HORIZ 108.6483    47.79129      0.023** 
 BACKW 60.46662    64.18597      0.346 
 FORWD -4.60302    9.295153     0.620 
17 HORIZ 7.874538   6.696237      0.240 
 BACKW -285.4084   64.75017     0.000*** 
 FORWD 369.2086   85.36808      0.000*** 
18 HORIZ -171.49   74.09196     0.021** 
 BACKW -36.15805   70.14407     0.606 
 FORWD 107.4209   66.80178      0.108 
19 HORIZ -363.3114      730.8245 0.619 
 BACKW -90.99053   252.2163     0.718 
 FORWD 1123.457       2039.455 0.582 
20 HORIZ -253.182  104.4676     0.015** 
 BACKW 228.3616   85.06541      0.007*** 
 FORWD 10.01837   4.920647      0.042** 
21 HORIZ 84.00779    219.4383      0.702 
 BACKW 587.1753  1738.556      0.736 
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 FORWD -8765.382  26773.18     0.743 
22 HORIZ 16.52144  405.0925      0.967 
 BACKW -50.42496  466.7071     0.914 
 FORWD 2.489286       15.46988 0.872 
24 HORIZ 321.0668   145.6645      0.028** 
 BACKW -536.9405   254.4795     0.035** 
 FORWD 60.26415  160.4213      0.707 
25 HORIZ 261.517   129.0344      0.043** 
 BACKW 69.54607   65.08481      0.285 
 FORWD -361.3796   236.9083     0.127 
26 HORIZ 97.29398   93.83184      0.300 
 BACKW 21.63538   112.3486      0.847 
 FORWD -75.43876   154.8777     0.626 
28 HORIZ 256.0794   154.2808      0.097* 
 BACKW -455.9235    220.637     0.039** 
 FORWD 328.5662   116.1722      0.005*** 
29 HORIZ -36.85368   53.05566     0.487 
 BACKW 87.61555   43.90553      0.046** 
 FORWD 110.6455   31.37677      0.000*** 
31 HORIZ .600165    9.816331      .951 
 BACKW -36.23904    87.42135     0.678 
 FORWD 104.9645    117.7466      0.373 
32 HORIZ 1.522343    21.75657      0.07** 
 BACKW - - - 
 FORWD - - - 
33 HORIZ -107.1033  59.24474     0.071* 
 BACKW -215.5712  62.72629     0.001*** 
 FORWD -124.7813   49.51427     0.012** 
34 HORIZ -34.57129    347.9393     0.921 
 BACKW -7.126194     323.524     0.982 
 FORWD 50.372      4064.411      0.990 
35 HORIZ 32.43023    28.32748      0.252 
 BACKW -26.45678    131.8247     0.841 
 FORWD 55.89969    85.78636      0.515 
36 HORIZ -88.53015   44.74494     0.048** 
 BACKW -125.0325   45.58966     0.006*** 
 FORWD 101.829   37.64726      0.007*** 
37 HORIZ 53.11422   70.73582      0.453 
 BACKW 102.0371   296.1224      0.730 
 FORWD -9635.63    10973.19     0.380 
  
*robust standard errors 
Source: own calculations based on panel dataset 
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